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RED FAMILIES V. BLUE FAMILIES
NAOMI CAHN AND JUNE CARBONE*
I.

INTRODUCTION

American family law has fractured. Prior waves of family law reform –
no fault divorce, marital property regimes, the dismantling of distinctions
associated with illegitimacy, child support enforcement -- have swept through
the country, and over time (and often a not very long time) produced a
remarkable degree of consensus about the core of family law.1 Continued
consensus, however, appears to be at an end. Central issues on the regulation of
sexuality, exemplified by abortion, control of teen sexuality, and federal and
state governments’ “marriage promotion” efforts have split the country,2 raising
anew the question of what federalism means in the context of family law.
This article shows that the current family values debate is particularly
intractable not just because the different family law regimes rest on different
paradigms, but because what we identify as “blue families” and “red families”
are living different lives, with different moral imperatives. While legal scholars
acknowledge the intractability of the values debate, they have not acknowledged
the central role of family law – and of the divergent family paradigms
underlying it.3 These unacknowledged differences contribute to a sense of
*
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University Law School. June Carbone is the Edward A. Smith-Missouri Professor of Law, the
Constitution and Society at the University of Missouri-Kansas City. The authors thank Jane
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manuscript
1
During a twenty-year period from 1965 to 1985, for example, every state in the country
adopted some method for dissolving a marriage without a showing of fault. See Herma Hill
Kay, From the Second Sex to the Joint Venture: An Overview of Women's Rights and Family
Law in the United States During the Twentieth Century, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 2017, 2064 (2000).
2
The majority opinion by Justice Kennedy and the dissenting opinion by Justice Ginsburg in the
Supreme Court’s partial-birth abortion case dramatically illustrate these divisions. See Gonzales
v. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. 1610 (2007).
3
Robert Post and Reva Siegal, for example, acknowledge the connection between Protestant
Fundamentalist opposition to abortion and changing gender roles, and demonstrate that abortion
did not become a rallying cry for the Protestant right until it became part of broader-based
values movement in the eighties. Robert Post and Reva Siegel, Roe Rage: Democratic
Constitutionalism and Backlash,__ HARV. C.R.-C.L. REV. (forthcoming 2007)
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=990968. William Eskridge further explores
the polarizing effect of same-sex marriage, and its particular divisiveness in more religious parts
of the country. William N. Eskridge, Body Politics: Lawrence v. Texas and the Constitution of
Disgust and Contagion, 57 FLA. L. REV. 1011 (2005). While these scholars acknowledge
different family values behind the political differences, they do not explore the role of different
family systems in either producing different values or different legal imperatives.
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“moral panic” that increases support for uncompromising positions and
threatens to undermine the perceived legitimacy of the judiciary itself. 4 We
believe that the first step in preserving the integrity of family law decisionmaking is recognition that two different legal regimes exist.
“Blue states,” that is, the states that voted Democratic in the 2004
presidential election,5 have moved toward a new family model. Blue families
are characterized by greater wealth, higher average levels of education, greater
urbanization, lower fertility levels, and lower levels of church attendance.6
They have been among the first to embrace a new family model, which we term
“the new middle class morality,” that responds to the post-industrial economy
by delaying childbearing and investing in the educational and workplace
opportunities of both men and women.7
To realize the advantages that have come with increased specialization
among women, the new model involves less control of sexuality, celebrates
more egalitarian gender roles, and promotes financial independence and
emotional maturity as the sine qua non of responsible parenthood. The
hallmarks of the new system’s success are lower rates of divorce and teen births;
its weaknesses may ultimately be falling fertility and high percentages of the
population living alone. In this new model, abstinence is unrealistic,
contraception is not only permissible, but morally compelled, and abortion is the
necessary (and responsible) fallback. Non-marital cohabitation is irrelevant to
child custody determinations absent an immediate impact on the child, but
domestic violence is a serious threat to family integrity that requires state
intervention. Recognition of same-sex relationships is a matter of basic
equality.8
The “red states,” that is, the states that voted Republican in the last
presidential election, have not just lagged in adjusting to the new model, but
they are increasingly saying “no” to its imperatives. Most prominently in the
mountain west, the rural plains, and the South, these states continue to
emphasize a more traditional family system that celebrates marriage as the
institution ordained to promote the unity of sex, procreation and childrearing.
This traditional system, in tandem with religious teachings about sin and guilt,
4

See Carol Sanger, Infant Safe Haven Laws: Legislating in the Culture Of Life, 106 COLUM. L.
REV. 753, 789 (2006) (defining “moral panic”).
5
In using the “red state,” “blue state” terminology, we are not taking a position on the debate
ranging in political science as to whether or not the culture wars are a myth. Compare MORRIS
P. FIORINA, SAMUEL J. ABRAMS & JEREMY C. POPE, CULTURE WAR? THE MYTH OF A
POLARIZED AMERICA (2004) with Alan Abramowitz and Kyle Saunders, Why Can’t We All Just
Get Along? The Reality of a Polarized America, 3 THE FORUM 1 (2005),
http://www.bepress.com/forum/vol3/iss2/art1.
6
See infra Section __ for further discussion of blue families.
7
For a fuller account of these changes, see JUNE CARBONE, FROM PARTNERS TO PARENTS: THE
SECOND REVOLUTION IN FAMILY LAW (2000).
8
We comprehensively develop this model at notes , infra.
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places a premium on the control of sexuality.9 As a result, it encourages
marriage relatively soon after (if not before) the beginning of sexual activity,
identifies responsible childbearing with family form rather than economic selfsufficiency or emotional maturity, and embraces more authoritarian models of
parenting and the state -- both should be able and willing to intervene to
promote the “right” moral values. Within red families, abstinence outside of
marriage is a moral imperative, the shotgun marriage is the preferred solution to
an improvident pregnancy, and socialization into traditional gender roles is
critical to marital stability.10 Abortion is an abomination not only because it
violates religious teachings about the beginning of life, but also because it
represents a determination to evade the consequences of immoral conduct. And
gay marriage is, if anything, worse than abortion – the symbol of at the ability to
flout moral teachings in the name of individualism and choice.11
Both family models have problems. The blue states have unprecedented
numbers who will never marry, falling fertility rates and considerable concern
about the lack of commitment within intimate relationships.12 Moreover, their
largest challenge may be the inequality the system produces between the
children who enjoy the advantages of intact, two income families and those of
the increasingly marginalized poor.13 Red state families, however, are in crisis
on their own terms. Although voters in red states care profoundly about
morality and marriage, red states have the highest divorce rates in the country.14
Although red states have the lowest abortion rates, their teens are also more
likely to become pregnant and to give birth to children the parents are illequipped to raise.15 Red states are poorer and the resources available to cushion
the consequences of family fragility may be dramatically less.16 Given the
9

Attitudes toward premarital sexuality differ considerably. While 93% of all Americans,
accordingly to a 2003 Gallup poll, believe that extramarital sex is morally wrong, with little
variation among political groups, there are dramatic differences with respect to premarital sex:
only 42% of self-identified conservatives compared to 80% of self-identified liberals believe
that premarital sex is morally acceptable. George H. Gallup, Jr., Current Views on Premarital,
Extramarital Sex, GALLUP POLL, June 24, 2003. There is similar variation on the importance of
marriage. In a 2006 poll, almost twice as many conservatives (85%) as liberals (43%) believe
that marriage is extremely important if the couple plans to stay together for life. Lydia Saad,
Americans Have Complex Relationship with Marriage, GALLUP POLL, May 30, 2006.
10
See W. Bradford Wilcox and Steven L. Nock, What’s Love Got To Do With It? Equality,
Equity, Commitment and Women’s Marital Quality, 84 SOC. FORCES 1321 (2006),
http://www.virginia.edu/sociology/peopleofsociology/wilcoxpapers/Wilcox%20Nock%20marria
ge.pdf
11
For a comprehensive examination of the red state position, see notes infra.
12
In Europe, which has largely adopted a blue state model, fertility is a much bigger source of
concern than divorce or non-marital sexuality. See e.g., Simona Bignami-Van Assche and
Francesco C. Billari, Pathways to Adulthood and Fertility: A Comparative Analysis of Italy and
Québec (2006), http://paa2006.princeton.edu/download.aspx?submissionId=60342.
13
See discussion infra at ___.
14
See the chart in Appendix B.
15
See discussion infra at notes ___.
16
See Naomi Cahn and June Carbone, Deep Purple: Religious Shades of Family Law, __ W.
VA. L. REV. __ (forthcoming 2008)(manuscript on file with authors).
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inherent difficulties of controlling sexual behavior and the atrophy of the social
forces that historically stigmatized non-marital births and coerced unhappy
couples to stay together, the red states must either increase their efforts to
reinstill the right values or give up the fight.17 They have accordingly sounded
a call to arms.
A large component of the determination to affirm the “right” values is
symbolic. Despite the continued existence of laws making fornication and
adultery crimes, prosecutions are rare. 18 And the Supreme Court has
invalidated the laws in the one arena most likely to receive prosecutorial
attention – consensual sodomy between same-sex partners.19 The more intense
fights come over the extension of state approval to traditionally “sinful” acts:
abstinence education in public schools (with education about contraception
implying acceptance of non-marital sexuality), abortion and same-sex marriage,
and non-marital cohabitation in custody conflicts.20 These issues go to the core
of the values divide.
We believe that the social and legal conflicts over these issues are so
intense, not just because the opposing views are on a collision course, but
because the lives of red families and blue families intersect their respective
family systems at different stages in the life cycle with different symbolic and
practical needs. Two primary demographic factors distinguish red families from
blue ones. The first is age. The average age of marriage in the United States as a
whole is now 25 for women and near 27 for men. In Massachusetts, among the
bluest of blue states, it is 27 for women and 29 for men. In Utah, the average
woman marries before she turns 22, the average man before 24.21 Yet, full
physical and mental maturity does not take place until the mid-twenties, and
marriage before the age of twenty-five is a significant risk factor for divorce.
Testosterone levels peak around age 25, and the impulsive behavior and risktaking associated with late adolescence does not begin to stabilize until the mid-

17

See, e.g., JAMES Q. WILSON, THE MARRIAGE PROBLEM (2003) (documenting the decline in
stigma associated with non-marital births and divorce and calling for the revitalization of the
commitment to marriage).
18
The Court in Lawrence v. Texas noted that, historically, the states outlawed non-procreative
sex even between married couples. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 569 (2003). Prosecutors,
however, generally chose not to prosecute private acts between consenting adults, and the law
treated the testimony of a consenting adult partner as the testimony of an accomplice, and
therefore inadmissible. Id. (“Under then-prevailing standards, a man could not be convicted of
sodomy upon testimony of a consenting partner, because the partner was considered an
accomplice. A partner’s testimony, however, was admissible if he or she had not consented to
the act or was a minor, and therefore incapable of consent”).
19
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
20
See, e.g., KRISTIN LUKER, WHEN SEX GOES TO SCHOOL: WARRING VIEWS ON SEX -- AND SEX
EDUCATION -- SINCE THE SIXTIES 156 (2006).
21
Infoplease, Median Age at First Marriage, INFORMATION PLEASE DATABASE (2007),
http://www.infoplease.com/ipa/A0005061.html.
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twenties. 22 Delayed marriage, however, requires addressing sexuality on terms
other than abstinence, and marriage before full emotional and financial maturity
requires a level of support no longer available for large parts of the population.23
The second demographic factor exacerbating values conflicts is church
attendance. Religious differences such as the historic divisions between
Catholics and Protestants are less a factor in family law than the intensity of
religious practices.24 Moreover, church attendance correlates not just with
different views about sexual morality, but also with a different orientation
toward authority. Regular church-goers appear to be more comfortable, for
example, with the use of force over diplomacy, authoritarian leadership styles,
state intervention in family life, and stricter parenting styles. As a result, they
do not just hold different views on issues such as the acceptability of nonmarital cohabitation or homosexuality; they also respond to different arguments
and start with different assumptions about the role of the state. These views,
which once may have commanded consensus support in the United States as a
whole, may no longer do so even within conservative, if not evangelical,
communities.25
These differences in worldviews, beliefs, and lived experiences pose
particularly sharp challenges for family law. Scholars debate the level of
political polarization in the United States, and all scholars acknowledge that

22

.See Craig M. Bennett and Abigail A. Baird, Anatomical Changes in the Emerging Adult
Brain: A Voxel-Based Morphometry Study, __ HUMAN BRAIN MAPPING __ (forthcoming
2007), http://theteenbrain.com/about/publications/pdfs/2005-Bennett-VBM.pdf; Elizabeth Scott
and Laurence Steinberg, Blaming Youth, 81 TEX. L. REV. 799 (2003). For an examination of
the relationship between complex legal issues and teen-agers’ rights, see Laura Rosenbury,
Between Home and School, 155 PA. L. REV. 833 (2007); Catherine J. Ross, Anything Goes:
Examining the State’s Interest in Protecting Children from Controversial Speech, 53 VAND. L.
REV. 427 (2000).
23
This means that the paradigm red state couple enters marriage not long after the woman
becomes sexually active, has two children by her mid-twenties, and reaches the critical period of
marriage at the high point in the life cycle for risk taking and experimentation. The
paradigmatic blue state couple is more likely to experiment with multiple partners, postpone
marriage until after they reach emotional and financial maturity, and have their children (if they
have them at all) as their lives are stabilizing. If the parents do separate, they are better prepared
to deal with the consequences. If nothing else, they may be too exhausted to seek new partners
if they still have young children as they approach forty. For the full development of this model,
see notes ___ infra and accompanying text.
24
Nonetheless, sectarian differences have not disappeared as Catholics sermons continue to
emphasize the immorality of abortion while Protestant churches place greater emphasis on the evils
of homosexuality. See infra at ______.
25
Sociologist Kristin Luker, for example, in her in-depth study of sex education observes that
conservatives view sex as sacred, while liberals view it as natural; conservatives view non-marital sex
as wrong “because the Bible says it is,” while liberals view reach normative conclusions more
instrumentally; and, unsurprisingly, conservative religious membership correlates with support for
abstinence education while the less observant are more likely to reach decisions on the content of sex
education based on its perceived effectiveness. LUKER, supra note ___, at 156.
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states vary politically and demographically within their borders.26 Yet, issues of
family cut much closer to core constituents of identity than economic or
philosophical issues.27 Professors Robert Post and Reva Siegel have recently
argued, in their reinterpretation of the opposition to Roe v. Wade,28 that the
perceived threat to the traditional family has been a primary concern motivating
the activists of the new era – and those activists have staked out more extreme
positions in the values debate.29 What Post and Siegel do not address is that the
more radical positions, to the extent they define moderates as partisans, have the
potential to undermine the integrity of the courts in the most profound and
prosaic of family issues. The Supreme Court may chose not to grant certiorari
in the most difficult of abortion cases, family courts have much more difficulty
finessing issues such as non-marital cohabitation.
This article examines the role of family law within a federal system at a
time of cultural conflict. Family law is, of course, primarily state law; it does
not need to be uniform across the many states. Nonetheless, state family law is
also mediated by constitutional decisions, federal legislation, uniform acts and
interstate transactions that transcend state boundaries. The role of these
bridging devices changes dramatically in an area in which the states are in
fundamental disagreement on the purposes of family regulation.30
This Article first documents the divergence between the two family
systems. Second, it examines the demographic differences between red states
and blue states. Third, it considers the extent to which state laws differ,
26

For a summary of the extensive political science literature on these issues, see DELIA
BALDASSARRI AND ANDREW GELMAN, PARTISANS WITHOUT CONSTRAINT: POLITICAL
POLARIZATION AND TRENDS IN AMERICAN PUBLIC OPINION, June 13, 2007,
http://www.stat.columbia.edu/~gelman/research/unpublished/BGpolarization4.pdf (finding
polarization on moral issues largely non-existent forty years ago, greater polarization today on
moral issues among the better educated and more politically active, and polarization on moral
issues increasing much more dramatically in since the mid-eighties) and EDWARD L. GLAESER
AND BRYCE A. WARD, MYTHS AND REALITIES OF AMERICAN POLITICAL GEOGRAPHY, HARVARD
INSTITUTE ON ECONOMIC RESEARCH, Discussion Paper No. 2100, January 2006 (concluding that
American political divisions have reverted to their pre-New Deal form, and have become
increasingly religious and cultural). See also John W. Evans, Have Americans’ Attitudes
Become More Polarized?—An Update, 84 SOC. SCI. Q. 71 (2004); MORRIS P. FIORINA, SAMUEL
J. ABRAMS & JEREMY C. POPE, CULTURE WAR? THE MYTH OF A POLARIZED AMERICA. (2004).
27
William N. Eskridge, Body Politics: Lawrence v. Texas and the Constitution of Disgust and
Contagion, 57 FLA. L. REV. 1011 (2005).
28
Robert Post and Reva Siegel, Roe Rage: Democratic Constitutionalism and Backlash,__
HARV. C.R.-C.L. REV. (forthcoming 2007)
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=990968
29
See Evans, supra note __ (reviewing the data and concluding that “While political scientists
have recently found less polarization among elected officials on economic issues, it seems clear
that members of the public who are involved in politics are becoming polarized on moral
issues.”).
30
For a discussion of the relationship between family law and federalism, see ( Reva B. Siegel, She
The People: The Nineteenth Amendment, Sex Equality, Federalism, And The Family, 115 HARV. L.
REV. 947 (2002); SYLVIA LAW, FAMILIES AND FEDERALSIM, 4 WASH. U. J. L. & POL’Y, 175 (2000).
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examining three areas of contention: teen abortion statutes, same-sex marriage,
and the role of non-marital sexuality in child custody decisionmaking. Fourth, it
discusses the legal strategies that can defuse rather than inflame these cultural
differences, and evaluates the factors that might over time produce greater
convergence – and the importance of courts in keeping the avenues of
transformation open.
II. CHANGING MORAL ASSUMPTION AND THE POLARIZATION OF FAMILY
LAW
Family law lies at the intersection of public and private law. Family
governance, like other forms of private law, creates a framework for dispute
resolution by establishing bright line statuses, default terms for adult
partnerships, and mandatory provisions designed to safeguard children’s wellbeing.31 Family law also serves, however, to promote societal interests by
reinforcing public norms, “channeling” intimate behavior along socially
approved pathways, and protecting children.32
This channeling poses a challenge for a liberal democratic state. On the
one hand, the inculcation of societal norms involves the imposition of state
mandated preferences on those who would choose other regimes. On the other
hand, democratic societies require the expression of values “that concern us and
bind us together."33 The courts have historically justified the coercion intrinsic
to the selection of one family regime over another on two grounds. First, they
recognize what is often a high degree of societal consensus on moral values. In
upholding restrictions on polygamy in the nineteenth century, for example, the
Supreme Court explicitly acknowledged the shared European roots on which the
United States was founded.34 Second, the courts recognized the practical need
to restrain sexuality in eras without effective contraception. In a world of

31

See Margaret F. Brinig, BOOK REVIEW: STATUS, CONTRACT AND COVENANT: A Review
of Family Law and the Pursuit of Intimacy by Milton C. Regan,Jr., 79 CORNELL L. REV. 1573 (1994)
(reviewing the importance of status as opposed to contract in family law).
32
See Carl E. Schneider, The Channelling Function in Family Law, 20 HOFSTRA L. REV. 495 (1992);
LinEvada C. McClain, Love, Marriage, and the Baby Carriage: Revising the Channelling Function of
Family Law, 28 CARD. L. REV. 2133 (2007);
33
ROBERT NOZICK, THE EXAMINED LIFE: PHILOSOPHICAL MEDITATIONS 286-87 (1989).
Indeed, at the end of his life, libertarian Robert Nozick concluded that the libertarian position he
had propounded was “seriously inadequate, in part because it did not fully knit the humane
considerations and joint cooperative activities it left room for more closely into its fabric.” He
emphasized the “symbolic importance of an official political concern with issues or problems, as
a way of marking their importance or urgency, and hence of expressing, intensifying,
channeling, encouraging, and validating our private actions and concerns toward them.” Id.
34
Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1879) (“Polygamy has always been odious
among the northern and western nations of Europe, and, until the establishment of the Mormon
Church, was almost exclusively a feature of the life of Asiatic and of African people.”)
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limited resources, notions of legitimacy and family morality served to order
claims for the provision of support. 35
In today’s world, the sense of shared values is frayed, and the need for
triage in the allocation of resources less compelling.36 This in turn heightens the
tension between individual expression and majoritarian norm creation.
Consider, for example, the exchange between Kennedy and Scalia in Lawrence
v. Texas. 37 Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority that struck down the laws
criminalizing same-sex sodomy, observed that the “issue is whether the majority
may use the power of the State to enforce these views on the whole society
through operation of the criminal law. ‘Our obligation is to define the liberty of
all, not to mandate our own moral code.’”38 Scalia’s scathing dissent accused
the majority of “taking sides in the culture wars,” and suggested that Kennedy’s
autonomy principle, applied to family creation, necessarily extends to state
protection for individual choice in the constitution of marriage, parenthood,
family relationships, childrearing and education.39 State promotion of shared
norms, and state policed family statuses would give way to autonomy, privacy,
and equality before the law.40
Unlike other scholars, we believe that the real challenge confronting
family law is not the stark choice between values promotion and libertarian
neutrality. We suspect that Scalia is right that true neutrality is impossible, and
we agree that the state benefits too greatly from shared understandings to
abandon the enterprise. Instead, we see the issue as one of how to decide which
values to promote, and how to make that choice in a time of polarization. To
address that issue, however, it is first necessary to consider why the family
values debate has become so intense. This section provides a concise history of
the relationship between changes in family values and social and economic
norms. Family values, even traditional family values, have never been static.
The moral and practical reorganization of family understandings is tied to a
changing society.41 Family composition is as much a way of ordering societal
investment as commercial organization, and societal change does not play out
evenly along lines of class, race, gender – or as we will argue here – region.
Instead, the middle class leads in forging new moral understandings, and often
35

See STEPHANIE COONTZ, MARRIAGE, A HISTORY: FROM OBEDIENCE TO INTIMACY OR HOW
LOVE CONQUERED MARRIAGE 30-31 (2005). The appearance of shared consensus did not mean
there were no contrary views, as, for example, shown by those who have rewritten gay legal
history. E.g., WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, GAYLAW: CHALLENGING THE APARTHEID OF THE CLOSET
(1999).
36
COONTZ, supra note __; McClain, supra note __, at 2139; Barbara Stark , Marriage Proposals:
From One-Size-Fits-All to Postmodern Marriage Law, 89 CALIF. L. REV. 1479 (2001).
37
539 U.S. 558 (2003).
38
Id. at 571.
39
Id. at 604 (emphasis in original).
40
See, e.g., Naomi Cahn, Models of Family Privacy, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1225 (1999); Jill
Elaine Hasday , The Canon of Family Law, 57 STAN. L. REV. 825 (2004).
41
For a much fuller account, see CARBONE, supra note __, at 48-49; 63-66; 108-09.
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the terms by which other groups are to be judged.42
A. Economic Transformation and the Renegotiation of Family Values
Two large scale economic transformations underlie the contemporary, and
differing, approaches to family values: the nineteenth century change from a
rural agricultural economy to a more urban industrial one, and the late twentieth
century shift from the industrial era to an information economy. 43
Both transformations redefined the relationship between home and market,
and produced greater investment in children by delaying childbearing and
reducing overall fertility.44 Both did so, at least in part, by redefining gender
roles and by moving to counter overreliance on the shotgun marriage.
Moreover, in both transformations, at least in the short term, changes in family
organization exacerbated societal inequality as the wealthier middle class used
the benefits of the new system to enhance its class standing. The first
transformation created a new middle class to staff the professions and
managerial ranks of the industrial economy. Critical to its success was greater
investment in boys’ formal education, which required in turn postponing
marriage and entry into the labor force.45 An important vehicle in producing
that result was an emphasis on women’s purity and their greater agency in
forging the new moral code.46 As women become more able and willing to say
“no,”47 the number of brides who gave birth within eight and a half months of
their wedding declined from 30% in 1800 to 10% by 1860, the average number

42

Id.
Some scholars refer to this as the “first demographic transformation.” See, e.g., Sara
McLanahan, Diverging Destinies: How Children are Faring After the Second Demographic
Transformation, 41 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 607 (2004). For a discussion of the contemporary
need for two-earners per family, see ELIZABETH WARREN AND AMELIA WARREN TYAGI, THE
TWO-INCOME TRAP: WHY MIDDLE-CLASS AMERICANS ARE GOING BROKE (2004).
44
CARBONE, supra note _, at 62-63.
45
Id. at 107-110.
46
The economic changes have been accompanied by what Joan Williams has termed the
ideology of domesticity, which focused on the “separate spheres” of home and market and
produced the “cult of true womanhood.” JOAN WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER: WHY FAMILY
AND WORK CONFLICT AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT (2000).
47
See Jane E. Larson, "Women Understand So Little, They Call My Good Nature 'Deceit'": A
Feminist Rethinking Of Seduction, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 374, 388 (1993) (“Victorian culture
exalted sexual restraint and designated women as caretakers of society's sexual virtue.”). Larson
also notes, however, that: “Although the Victorian convention of female sexual modesty
repressed women's sexuality, it also strengthened women's social authority and dignity,
empowering women to resist male sexual demands and thus shifting the balance of power
between men and women in the private sphere.” Id. at 389-90. See also CARL N. DEGLER, AT
ODDS: WOMEN AND THE FAMILY IN AMERICA FROM THE REVOLUTION TO THE PRESENT, 180-83
(1980) (describing declining birth rates that followed women’s greater ability to decline sexual
intercourse).
43
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of children per family fell from eight in 1800 to four by centuries’ end, and the
average age of marriage rose.48
These changes affected the moral understandings of the country as a
whole in spite of the fact that the urban middle class, the driving force behind
the changes, constituted a tiny part of the population. Innovative research
details the transmission of these values through newly created women’s
magazines that influenced the farm wives who would constitute the majority of
women until the much greater urbanization of the twentieth century.49 But class
divisions ironically served to reinforce, rather than undermine, the new order.
Mary Ryan emphasizes that the cultural divide in upstate New York involved
the often-pejorative comparison of native-born Protestants with newly arriving
Catholic immigrants. The Protestant middle class identified moral superiority
with their emphasis on their daughters’ chastity, their determination to keep
their children away from the temptations or either employment or romance at
too young an age, and their restriction of family size.50 The opinion leaders in
newspapers, legislatures, courts and many pulpits heralded the new middle class
standards as the moral order of the day, and the standard by which other classes
might be found wanting.51
The second, twentieth century transformation began in similar fashion.
The “post-industrial economy” has moved away from heavy manufacturing to

48

LINDA HIRSHMAN & JANE LARSON, HARD BARGAINS: THE POLITICS OF SEX (1998). Professor
Larson further observes that: “A modest girl's shyness and innocence were her excuses for
sexual delay, allowing her a leisurely period of courtship during which she could observe her
lover and judge his qualities as a future husband. Female sexual modesty came to represent a
strategic advantage in the competitive "marriage market." According to the conventional
wisdom of Victorian advice manuals, men might dally with permissive women, but they married
only modest ones. Both by threats and incentives, sexual modesty was thus inculcated in young
women to protect them against the genuine threat that sexuality presented to their future
welfare.” Larson, “Women Understand so Little,” supra note __, at 392.
49
For a thoughtful and comprehensive discussion of the changes, see Joan Williams, Toward a
Reconstructive Feminism: Reconstructing the Relationship of Market Work and Family Work, 19 N.
ILL. U. L. REV. 89 (1998).
50
MARY P. RYAN, CRADLE OF THE MIDDLE CLASS: THE FAMILY IN ONEIDA COUNTY, NEW
YORK, 1790-1865 184-85 (1981). The Catholic working classes, in contrast, often depended on
their children’s labor for their families’ survival, creating incentives for larger families that
transcended religious differences. Moreover, factory employment, which for working class
families could start even before the teen years, made parental supervision that much more
difficult and further encouraged younger marriages. See Elizabeth Pleck, A Mother’s Wages:
Income Earning Among Married Italian and Black Women, 1896-1911, in THE AMERICAN
FAMILY IN SOCIO-HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 490-515 (ed. Michael Cordon 1983)(3d ed.).
51
See, e.g., ELIZABETH FOX-GENOVESE, WITHIN THE PLANTATION HOUSEHOLD: BLACK AND
WHITE WOMEN OF THE OLD SOUTH 192-241 (1988) (describing gulf between slaveholding and
enslaved women in the antebellum American South); JACQUELINE JONES, LABOR OF LOVE,
LABOR OF SORROW: BLACK WOMEN, WORK, AND THE FAMILY FROM SLAVERY TO THE PRESENT
1-151 (1985) (comparing experience of free and enslaved black women in southern United
States); see also Linda K. Kerber, Separate Spheres, Female Worlds, Woman's Place: The
Rhetoric of Women's History, 75 J. AM. HIST. 9, 10 (1988).
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greater emphasis on the “information economy” and the service sector.52 The
result is even greater returns to education, this time for both men and women as
the new economy has created greater demand for the types of services women
historically performed.53 Just as the nineteenth century changes brought greater
specialization among men, the twentieth century changes involve greater
specialization among women, as the new class of working mothers hires other
women to care for their children (and frozen food diners and McDonald’s) to
perform what were once viewed as mothers’ domestic responsibilities.54
Moreover, just as the nineteenth century required a family reorganization
and a new moral code for the middle class to reap the benefits of the new order,
so too have the twentieth century changes required moral understandings that
facilitate this greater investment in women -- and even later childbearing and
smaller family size. These new moral understandings, however, were unlikely
to rest on increased parental vigilance and celebration of women’s virtue.
While conservatives continue to decry the sexual revolution of the
sixties, the sixties followed from the demographic changes of the fifties, which
sounded the death knell of the old moral order.55 Indeed, as historian Stephanie
Coontz argues, the “traditional” family of the fifties was in fact a qualitatively
new phenomenon that reversed the trends of the rest of the century.56 By 1960,
the number of pregnant brides rose to almost a third, a level not seen since
1800.57 The average age of marriage fell to the lowest levels in the twentieth
century.58 And, of course, the post-war era produced the “baby boom” —and
dramatic rises in fertility.59 Dating had become an exercise in sexual
brinkmanship, with marriage or adoption as the fallbacks for sexual
experimentation.60 The changing mores of the postwar era and the needs of the
new economy were on a collision course and something had to give way.

52

See, e.g., Richard G Harris, The knowledge-based economy: intellectual origins and new economic
perspectives, 3 INTL. J. MAN. REV. 21 (2001)
53
See CARBONE, supra note __, at 48-49 summarizing these developments
54
See Betsey Stevenson and Justin Wolfers, Marriage and Divorce: Changes and their Driving
Forces, 21 J. ECON. PERSP. 27 (2007),
http://bpp.wharton.upenn.edu/jwolfers/Papers/MarriageandDivorce(JEP).pdf.
55
Carol Sanger brilliantly describes the role of cars and suburbanization in allowing teens to
escape parental restraints. Carol Sanger, Girls and the Getaway: Cars, Culture, and the
Predicament of Gendered Space, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 705 (1995); see more generally BETH L.
BAILEY, FROM FRONT PORCH TO BACK SEAT: COURTSHIP IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA 19
(1988) (explaining how the invention of the automobile contributed to the rise of dating by
giving young people both privacy and mobility).
56
STEPHANIE COONTZ, THE WAY WE NEVER WERE: AMERICAN FAMILIES AND THE NOSTALGIA
TRAP 25-26 (1992).
57
LINDA HIRSHMAN & JANE LARSON, HARD BARGAINS: THE POLITICS OF SEX 92 (1998).
58
Andrew J. Cherlin, American Marriage in the Early Twenty-First Century, 15 THE FUTURE OF
CHILDREN 33, 35 (2005).
59
COONTZ, NOSTALGIA TRAP, supra note __, at 202-03.
60
Id. at 39.
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B. The New Middle Class Morality and Cultural Backlash
What gave way first was the old moral code. The sexual revolution and
women’s movements now identified with the sixties remade middle class
morality from an emphasis on woman’s virtue to concern for equality and
responsibility.61 The transformation began as the baby boomers reached their
college years. The new demographic bridled at college parietal rules and sexual
double standards. The “pill” galvanized the shift from abstinence to
contraception as the hallmark of responsible behavior.62 The emotionally
agonizing choice of abortion also reinforced the conviction that childbearing
should be reserved for the right partner at the right time in life.63 The media
celebrated the new sexual freedom,64 and by the eighties, the majority of the
Americans no longer condemned pre-marital sexuality.65
The remaking of moral understandings produced a cycle of reinforcing
shifts in attitudes. As women gained greater ability to avoid unplanned
pregnancies, men felt less obligation to marry the women they impregnated.66
As non-marital sexuality became more acceptable, so too did the children who
resulted, making their mothers more willing to raise them without marrying.67
In a parallel fashion, the shotgun marriages of the fifties produced the divorces
61

See LINDA C. MCCLAIN, THE PLACE OF FAMILIES: FOSTERING CAPACITY, EQUALITY, AND
RESPONSIBILITY (2006).
62
See George A. Akerloff, Janet L. Yellin, and Michael L. Katz, An Analysis of Out-of Wedlock
Childbearing in the United States, 111 Q. J. ECONOMICS 277-303 (1996)(arguing that availability of
contraception and abortion ironically contributed to the increase in non-marital births as women
assumed responsibility for avoiding pregnancy, and men no longer felt obligated to marry
unintentionally pregnant partners).
63
CARBONE, supra note __ , at 203-04.
64
Barbara Whitehead notes that ninety percent of women born between 1933 and 1942 were
either virgins when they married or had engaged in their first intercourse with the man they
subsequently married. Today, in contrast, the average age of first intercourse for women is 17
while the average age of first marriage is twenty-five. Barbara Dafoe Whitehead, The Changing
Pathway to Marriage: Trends in Dating, First Unions, and Marriage among Young Adults, in
FAMILY TRANSFORMED: RELIGION, VALUES, AND SOCIETY IN AMERICAN LIFE 168, 170 (Steven
M. Tipton and John Witte Jr. eds., 2005).
65
By 1997, the Gallup poll found that fifty-five percent of American adults say that premarital
sex is not wrong, and among the most directly affected, viz., the younger crowd aged 18-29,
75% agreed that “pre-marital sexual relations are not wrong.” Frank Newport, Gallup Poll
Review From The Poll Editors: Sexual Norms: Where Does America Stand Today?, THE
GALLUP POLL, December 1997, http://www.hi-ho.ne.jp/taku77/refer/sexnorm.htm. Moreover,
2002 data indicate that by age 20, 77% of respondents had had sex, and 75% had premarital sex.
By age 44, 95% of respondents (94% of women, 96% of men, and 97% of those who had ever
had sex) had had premarital sex. Even among those who abstained until at least age 20, 81%
had had premarital sex by age 44. Finer concludes that “[a]lmost all Americans have sex before
marrying.” Lawrence B. Finer, Trends in Premarital Sex in the United States, 1954-2003, 122
PUB. HEALTH REPS. 73 (2007).
66
Akerlof, Yellin, and Katz, supra note __.
67
Id. at 308 (noting also that agency adoptions fell by one- half in the five years following the
legalization of abortion).
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of the seventies, and less reliable marriages created greater incentives for
women to invest in their own earning potential.68 As women attained greater
independence, the consequences of divorce became less catastrophic, and
unhappy partners felt less pressure to stay together. Increasing divorces made
single parents more visible, which weakened even further the stigma associated
with non-marital births. Taken together, these changes undermined the
economic and social coercion that had promoted family stability whatever the
quality of the enduring unions.
Conservative writers decry these changes as signs of moral decay. Indeed,
the shift away from marriage and two-parent families has undeniably had
negative consequences for children.69 It is a mistake, however, to see the
transformation only in terms of family disintegration. Underlying the changes
and less visible than the Playboy centerfolds that merit denunciation from the
pulpit is a new middle class ethic – with handsome rewards for those able to
reap its benefits. The college educated, who postpone childrearing until the
parents achieve a measure of financial self-sufficiency and emotional maturity,
have become more likely to marry and less likely to divorce than the rest of the
population, with two-parent families that remain intact, replicating the statistics
that existed before no-fault divorce, the pill and legalized abortion.70 The rest of
the country has seen skyrocketing rates of non-marital births, divorce, and
single-parent families, magnifying the effects of income inequality on children.
71
The hallmark of this new middle-class ethic is later ages of family formation,
68

As women gained experience and self-confidence, they won benefits that made work more
attractive and rewarding; with longer work experience and greater educational equalization, they
became freer to leave an unhappy marriage; and as divorce became more of a possibility,
women tended to hedge their bets by insisting on the right to work. Although very few
researchers believe that women’s employment has been a direct cause of the rising divorce rate,
most agree that women’s new employment options have made it easier for couples to separate if
they are dissatisfied for other reasons. In turn, the fragility of marriage has joined economic
pressures, income incentives, educational preparation, and dissatisfaction with domestic
isolation as one of the reasons that modern women choose to work. See COONTZ, NOSTALGIA
TRAP, supra note __,at 166.
69
SARA S. MCLANAHAN AND GARY SANDAFUR, GROWING UP WITH A SINGLE PARENT: WHAT
HELPS, WHAT HURTS 109-10 (1994).
70
For example, Sara McLanahan observes that “Children who were born to mothers from the
most advantaged backgrounds are making substantial gains in resources. Relative to their
counterparts 40 years ago, their mothers are more mature and more likely to be working at wellpaying jobs. These children were born into stable unions and are spending more time with their
fathers. McLanahan, supra note __, at 608.
71
Id. at 611. In the top quartile, only seven percent of children resided in single parent families;
in the bottom educated quartile, 43% did. Moreover, for the best educated, rates of single
parenthood peaked in 1970, and have declined since then. For the least educated, the rates rose
sharply until 1990, and declined only in the last ten years. Id. McLanahan finds further that
college educated women have now become more likely to marry than other women and less
likely to divorce. For couples with a four-year degree, divorce rates peaked in the late seventies
with roughly a quarter of marriages ending within ten years. The rates then fell to 17% by the
late eighties. For couples without college degrees, divorce rates reached their height with 35%
divorcing within ten years, and declined only slightly (to about 32%) by the late eighties. Id.
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when adult behavior has stabilized. Sara McLanahan shows that for the besteducated quartile of American women, mothers’ median age rose from 26 in
1970 to 32 in 2000.72 For mothers in the bottom quartile, it remained relatively
flat.73 For those who avoid early child-bearing, conventional families with two
married parents and a high degree of stability follow to a remarkable degree
with a minimum of external coercion.
This new middle class ethic, unlike its nineteenth century counterpart, is
a direct affront to those who do not accept its premises. The nineteenth century
emphasis on purity, with its condemnation of those who could not live up to its
principles, may have been hypocritical (and often racist), but it reaffirmed
consensus-based standards of morality. The new version, in contrast, is
disdainful of traditional moral restraints, insistent on the rights of women and
increasingly same-sex couples, and skeptical of once venerated institutions such
as marriage.74
Traditionalists have responded to the changes in family form, the
negative consequences for children, and the class-based nature of the
transformation with a sense of moral panic.75 If advocates of the new order are
right that a promising future is the best contraceptive, this is disturbing news for
poorer men and women who face less hopeful prospects for either marriage or
employment. The welfare reform legislation enacted in the mid-nineties, for
example, was intended to address “the crisis of out-of-wedlock childbearing.”76
The first three legislative findings state that: "(1) Marriage is the foundation of
a successful society. (2) Marriage is an essential institution of a successful
society which promotes the interests of children. (3) Promotion of responsible
fatherhood and motherhood is integral to successful child rearing and the wellbeing of children."77
72

Id. at 609.
It should be noted, however, that fertility rates have also dropped, especially for teens.
Between 1960 and 2000, for example, births to 15 to 19 year old women fell by more than half.
The composition of the remaining births nonetheless varies by race and class. White women,
for example, have higher birth rates in every age group above twenty-five, while AfricanAmericans have higher birth rates in every cohort under twenty-five, even though both races
report substantial declines in teen childbearing. See Child Trends Data Bank, Percentage of
Births to Unmarried Women,
http://www.childtrendsdatabank.org/indicators/75UnmarriedBirths.cfm.
74
See, e.g., MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY AND
OTHER TWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES (1995).
75
See Sanger, Infant Safe Haven Laws, supra note __(discussing the role of moral panic in
generating support for little needed or punitive policies); see also Amy L. Wax, Engine of Inequality:
Race, Class, and Families by Choice, RUTGERS L. REV. (2007)(forthcoming).
76
Amy L. Wax, The Two-Parent Family in the Liberal State: The Case for Selective Subsidies,
1 MICH. J. RACE & L. 491 (1996).
77
104 P.L. 193, 110 Stat. 2105, §101 (1996), Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity
Conciliation Act of 1996, codified at 42 U.S.C. 601 (2007). See also Gwendolyn Mink,
WELFARE’S END 43 (1998) (emphasizing the legislative history referring to marriage, marital
parenting and paternal involvement); Tonya L. Brito, From Madonna To Proletariat:
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Critical to these traditionalist ideals is the reassertion of marriage as the
institution that unites sex, procreation and childrearing. The Institute for
American Values, in its statement on “Marriage and the Law” reasons that: “The
vast majority of human children are created through acts of passion between
men and women. Connecting children to their mother and father requires a
social and legal institution called “marriage” with sufficient power, weight, and
social support to influence the erotic behavior of young men and women.”78
Rather than ground family morality in investment in higher education and
disciplined childbearing, these advocates continue to celebrate the unity of sex,
marriage and reproduction. The reward in this system, particularly for those
who may never reach the enhanced status that comes with dual college-educated
earners, is family life itself. Only if women “save themselves” for marriage,
men have consistent access to women exclusively through marriage, and
marriage remains a prerequisite for responsible parenthood can the traditional
order maintain its moral force.79 If men enjoy sex without responsibility and
women can construct parenthood on terms of their choosing, why does anyone
(and more particularly the eighteen and nineteen olds eager to get on with their
lives) have reason to wait – or plan, invest, save and prove themselves ready for
adulthood?
This clash of moral worldviews plays itself out in settings that have
always involved a sizeable degree of intensity, viz., the control of sexuality. It
also, however, involves competing moral aspirations in the image of the good
life. Setting the terms for those aspirations—and for channeling behavior
accordingly—has historically been the province of family law.80
C. Legal Reform and the Struggle to Redefine the Moral Center
The law rarely plays a direct role in family transformation; it more
commonly crystallizes a change that has already taken root. In the nineteenth
century, for example, the most visible marker of women’s greater moral
standing was the Married Women’s Property Acts. Yet, the first wave of
legislation, revisionists now argue, had more to do with the protection of family
property from creditors than with women’s rights; and only the successive
waves toward the end of the century reflected women’s greater standing.81 In
Constructing A New Ideology Of Motherhood In Welfare Discourse, 44 VILL. L. REV. 415
(1999).
78
Marriage and the Law: A Statement of Principles, INSTIT. FOR AMER. VALUES, CENTER FOR
MARRIAGE & FAM. (2006), http://www.americanvalues.org/pdfs/mlawstmnt_exsumm.pdf, last
visited April 9, 2007.
79
Wilson, supra note __, at 216-17.
80
See Carl E. Schneider, The Channelling Function in Family Law, 20 HOFSTRA L. REV. 495
(1992); Linda C. McClain, Love, Marriage, and the Baby Carriage: Revising the Channelling
Function of Family Law, 28 CARD. L. REV. 2133 (2007).
81
See Richard H. Chused, Married Women's Property Law: 1800-1850, 71 GEO. L.J. 1359,
1398-1400 (1983)(arguing that first wave did not represent feminist gains); Joan Hoff, Law,
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this context, the states enacted legislation, one at a time,82 without the interstate
differences attaining particular importance, and with most of the legal changes
occurring only after the changes in social sentiment made the affected laws
seem archaic.
The modern clash, in contrast, has become geographic and cultural – and
it is now very much about law. Perhaps the two most polarizing issues of the
day are abortion and same-sex marriage.83 Both have become the subject of
multiple cases in federal and state courts, where they have been framed, not as
family law issues, but as constitutional mandates.84 The cases are
controversial, as we argue in the rest of this article, because they go to the
symbolic heart of the values divide: the clash between different understandings
of the normative commands of the two systems we have sketched above.
The law has accordingly become a fulcrum for the values divide. Both
family law legislation and judicial decisions play out in the context of the state
political systems in which they are forged. If no middle ground exists, if
neutrality means taking sides, then every state has a position. We will argue
below that the “blue states” have adopted one strand of the Anglo-American
family system: postponing childrearing until the parents achieve a measure of
financial self-sufficiency, by which time the peak periods of testosterone
production have passed, and couples can be expected to form stable
relationships with a minimum of societal effort.85 Correspondingly, the laws of
blue states guarantee access to contraception and abortion, their courts are
generally less likely to consider sexual issues (such as adultery or sexual
orientation) in custody decisions,86 and they are less likely to rely on abstinence
education. “Red states,” in contrast, continue to link family stability to the
control of sexuality, and internalized values that associate sexuality exclusively
Gender and Injustice: A Legal History of U.S. Women, 377-81 (1991) ("Women reformers were
only marginally involved ... in the passage of the Married Women's Property Acts in the 1830s
and 1840s" and cataloguing passage of acts in the appendix.). See also Reva B. Siegel, The
Modernization of Marital Status Law: Adjudicating Wives' Rights to Earnings, 1860-1930, 82
GEO. L. J. 2127, 2136 (1994) (maintaining that successive waves of reform in the middle and
later parts of the nineteenth century reflected feminist lobbying and women’s changing status).
82
See generally KATHLEEN S. SULLIVAN, CONSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT: WOMEN AND RIGHTS
DISCOURSE IN NINETEENTH CENTURY AMERICAN (2007)(different years for states’ enactment of
Married Women’s Property Acts).
83
See Post and Siegel, supra note 3, on (abortion); and Eskridge, supra note 3 (same-sex marriage)
84
MARY ANN GLENDON, ABORTION AND DIVORCE IN WESTERN LAW (1987)(comparing court
mandate in the U.S. with legislative decision-making in Europe); Paul D. Carrington, Restoring
Vitality to State and Local Politics by Correcting the Excessive Independence of the Supreme Court,
50 ALA. L. REV. 397 (1999).
85
See LAWRENCE STONE, THE FAMILY, SEX AND MARRIAGE IN ENGLAND, 1500-1800 44 (1977)
(characterizing delayed marriage and the emphasis on financial independence as a unique feature of
the northwestern European family.)
86
See generally William B. Turner, The Lesbian De Facto Parent Standard in Holtzman v Knott:
Judicial Policy Innovation and Diffusion, 22 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 135
(2007)(Tables 2 and 3) (manuscript available through www.sssrn.com/abstract=958648.
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with marriage and reproduction.87 They do so in the context of more traditional,
often more rural, and more working class cultures in which adults are ready to
begin childbearing at younger ages, and expect to marry shortly after women
become sexually active. Emphasizing abstinence education, legal control by
parents of teen contraception and abortion decisions, less tolerance of gay and
lesbian sexual behavior, their laws express continuing disapproval of nonmarital sexuality.88
The family transformation of the later half of the twentieth century,
unlike its predecessor in the nineteenth, clashes profoundly with the religious
tenets held by more traditional parts of the country, and at least for the moment,
the hinterlands are not willing to follow the lead of the urban middle class or the
coasts. The result appears to be an irreconcilable conflict between two very
different moral and family systems – producing distinctively different laws.
III. DEMOGRAPHIC DIVERGENCE AND THE REMAKING OF FAMILY LIFE
Throughout this paper, we use the red/blue designation as a shorthand for
regional variations that might underlie the development of one family model over
another, recognizing that we are measuring something more than simply the size of
the margin for Bush in the 2004 election.89 The first part of this section explores
voting patterns, ranking the states in accordance with their 2004 vote, and then
explains why we use this somewhat imperfect shorthand. In doing so, we make
no prediction about the 2008 election (indeed, we suspect a realignment in
voting patterns may well occur); rather we identify the lifestyle models and
family laws we predict will continue to diverge between the two sets of states.
Next, we identify demographic variables that might distinguish one family
system from the other, and rank the top five and the bottom five states for each
characteristic. We then consider whether consequences such as divorce and
non-marital births follow similar geographic patterns, and finally we consider
whether state patterns of family regulation bear any relationship to red and blue
demographic differences.
A. Red v. Blue: Or the Bible Belt and Mountain West v. the Northeast and the
87

See CARBONE, supra note __, at 60 (discussing Northwestern Europe).
See notes infra.
89
There are, of course, variations within states, generally related to the urban/rural nature of the
population, religious affiliation, etc. We are painting with a broad brush in noting these trends.
See generally EDWARD L. GLAESER AND BRYCE A. WARD, MYTHS AND REALITIES OF AMERICAN
POLITICAL GEOGRAPHY 33-34 (2006),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=874977 (noting “the continuum of states
ranging from the poor conservative places of the south and east to the rich, liberal places of the
coasts . . . . [and] that American parties are increasing[sic] oriented around religion and culture
rather than economics”); STEVEN ANSOLABEHERE, JONATHAN RODDEN, AND JAMES M. SNYDER,
JR., PURPLE AMERICA 3 (2005), http://econ-www.mit.edu/faculty/download_pdf.php?id=1266
(challenging the culture war argument and finding that most of the population can be
characterized as moderate).
88
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West Coast?
In characterizing the polarization of family law, we start with a dilemma.
The “red state”/”blue state” designations correspond to the votes in the
presidential election of 2004, 90 but the Republican/Democratic vote is only a
crude marker for the cultural systems we are attempting to capture. Appendix B
shows states ranked according to the percentage of voters who selected George
Bush. All of the states in the Northeast and the mid-Atlantic are blue. The
remaining blue states are either on the West Coast (California, Oregon,
Washington, and Hawaii) or in the upper mid-west (Illinois, Michigan,
Minnesota, and Wisconsin). Moreover, the Midwest states of MI, MN and WI,
along with OR, PA, and NH, were so close in votes they could easily be
characterized as “purple.”91
The 31 red states are more culturally diverse. The first three red states
(Utah, Wyoming, and Idaho) are mountain west states with a concentration of
Mormon voters in Utah and southern Idaho, but not Wyoming. The remaining
red states are in the plains, the South, the border, Southwest and central midwest. Six of these states (Colorado, Florida, Iowa, New Mexico, Nevada, and
Ohio) can be characterized as purple, and they reinforce the overall sense of the
southwest and Midwest as battlegrounds.92 All were close in both the 2000 and
2004 elections. Some of the states, particularly Ohio and Colorado, may be
characterized by urban /rural splits within the state.
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The blue states are: California, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Maine, Maryland,
Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Oregon,
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Vermont, Washington, and Wisconsin. The rest are red. See
MICHAEL GASTNER, COSMA SHALIZI, AND MARK NEWMAN, ET AL., MAPS AND CARTOGRAMS OF
THE 2004 US PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION RESULTS, http://www-personal.umich.edu/~mejn/election.
As they emphasize, however, using a scale of percentage of voters results in a map that is more
purple than red. Id.; see ROBERT J. VANDERBIEL, ELECTION 2004 RESULTS,
http://www.princeton.edu/~rvdb/JAVA/election2004/ Moreover, Bush or Kerry won by less
than 6% in 12 of these states,
91
In their study of electoral polarization, Abramowitz and Saunders excluded the 12 states in
which the margin of victory was less than 6%, identifying these states as “purple, Abramowitz
and Saunders, supra note __, at 13, and we believe that such a characterization is useful for
purposes of measuring the degree of national political division. These twelve states, some of
which were in the Kerry column, some of which were in the Bush column, were: Colorado,
Florida, Iowa, Michigan, Minnesota, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, Ohio, Oregon,
Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin. The analysis in this article, however, is more focused on
identifying regional patterns than on examining precise voting outcomes in specific elections,
particularly as the 2008 election looms on the horizon . New Hampshire is perhaps the most
complex of the “purpose states” in these terms. It has historically been Republican, and, indeed,
is the only state to have voted for Bush in 2000, but for Kerry in 2004. Political analysts believe
a factor in the New Hampshire voting switch was the growth of the Boston suburbs, with
migration from decidedly more liberal Massachusetts changing the demographics of what had
once been a more rural state.
92
All were decided by less than 6% points, consistent with the Abramowitz and Saunders
definition. Id. at 13.
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For our purposes, the factor that is more relevant than the total
Republican vote is the intensity of voter positions on issues related to moral
values – at least to the extent those views serve as cultural markers of the two
family systems we describe, and we suspect that they do. That is, we suspect
that the intensity of the political commitment to “moral values” indicates a
willingness to support legislation that would produce different laws from those
adopted in areas of the country committed to what we have called the “new
middle class morality.” We will test that hypothesis in this part of the paper.
In 2004, pollsters, for the first time, included “moral values” in the list of
issues they asked to voters to rank in importance.93 Voters chose moral values
and the economy, respectively, as their two top concerns, with roughly 22% of
the electorate listing each. Terrorism, the war in Iraq, health care, education and
other issues followed. For those choosing “moral values,” 78% voted for Bush,
while 80% of those selecting the economy as their primary concern voted for
Kerry. In Ohio, an all important bellwether state with an anti-gay marriage
proposition on the ballot designed to increase turnout among evangelicals, 90%
of those listing moral values as their top concern voted for Bush, according to an
independent FOX News-Opinion Dynamics poll taken on election night.94
Pundits disagree about the impact of the moral values issue on the election
outcome, but most accept that it serves as a marker of regional differences in
outlook. John Green and Mark Silk, for example, note that Bush carried every
region (Southern Crossroads, Mountain West, the South and the Midwest)95 in
which the percentage of voters choosing moral values as the issue of greatest
importance exceeded the national average, while he lost every region (New
England, the Middle Atlantic, Pacific and Pacific Northwest) in which moral
values voters fell below the national average.96 Moreover, in the regions that
Bush carried, a higher percentage of Bush voters (two-fifths or more) ranked
moral values as their top concern, while Kerry carried the regions in which Bush
voters ranked moral values as a lesser concern.97 The second and third most
highly rated issues (the economy and terrorism), in contrast, did not vary
93

The other issues included the economy, terrorism, Iraq, taxes, education, and health care. See
CNN.com, Election Results (2005),
http://www.cnn.com/ELECTION/2004/pages/results/states/US/P/00/epolls.0.html.
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Kelley Beaucar Vlahos, Values Help Shape Bush Re-Election, FoxNews.com, November 04,
2004, http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,137535,00.html.
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Green and Silk’s definition of regions differs somewhat from the ones used in the census and
which we use in this article. We find, for example, on values issues that Utah, Wyoming and
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urban and more racially diverse, and the “Southern Crossroads” region, which combines
Louisiana, with demographics more characteristic of the Deep South, with Texas, whose large
Latino population makes it somewhat more characteristic of the Southwest, with Oklahoma,
Arkansas and Missouri, states that we believe have more in common with the border states of
Kentucky, Tennessee, and West Virginia.
96
John C. Green and Mark Silk, Why Moral Values Did Count, 8 RELIGION IN THE NEWS
(2005), http://www.trincoll.edu/depts/csrpl/RINVol8No1/WhyMoral%20ValuesDidCount.htm.
97
Id.
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regionally to any significant degree.98
The 2004 exit polls did not ask about moral values in every state,
however, and no comprehensive data exist that allow the same analysis by
state.99 While a state-by-state breakdown might provide greater insight, the
available results suggest, in Martin and Silk’s words, that: “Geography matters
in American politics today above all” and ultimately, “those first-day stories about
moral values—and the red-and-blue maps that went with them—conveyed
something real.”100 That “something real” includes the use of “moral values” to
signal commitment to a political approach in which opposition to abortion and
same-sex marriage are organizing principles, and matters that generate voter
intensity.101 In the absence of comprehensive data about “moral values,” we agree
that the overall 2004 election outcomes provide a rough guide to regional variations
in worldviews.
We recognize further that all commentators on the 2004 election emphasize
that every state is “purple” to some degree, and that county breakdowns show blue
and red patches within states, often corresponding to urban/rural divisions.
Nonetheless, even the county breakdowns reflect regional variations. New
England, for example, has now emerged as the most intensely “blue” part of the
country, by county as well as by state, followed by the mid-Atlantic region and the
West Coast.102 The three states with the smallest percentages of Republican voters
in the 2004 election were all from New England, and, as noted earlier, Kerry
carried every New England and mid-Atlantic state.103

98

Id. The fourth issue (Iraq) did vary more, with those regions in which the war concerned a
higher percentage of voters voting for Kerry.

99

Id. Green and Silk note that “[u]nfortunately, such an analysis cannot be conducted for the
2005 election because the number of interviews per state in the national exit poll is not high
enough to give meaningful results for many states—and not all state exit polls included a “moral
values” option.”

100

Id.
Id. Green and Silk observe further that while moral values voters describe a block dominated
by Protestant evangelicals in areas of the country in which evangelicals have organized, the
evangelical discourse has selectively influenced those of other religions. They include, for
example, an in depth comparison of magenta Ohio (which Bush carried) and violet Michigan (a
Kerry state). Both states include significant numbers of church attending Catholics. Bush
carried the Catholic vote in Ohio, however, but lost it in Michigan. See also supra note 28,
particularly Baldassari and Gelman suggesting greater polarization on moral values than other
issues.
102
See MICHAEL GASTNER, COSMA SHALIZI, AND MARK NEWMAN, ET AL., MAPS AND
CARTOGRAMS OF THE 2004 US PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION RESULTS, http://wwwpersonal.umich.edu/~mejn/election. We adopt Green and Silk’s definition of New England as
Massachusetts, Connecticut, Vermont, New Hampshire, Rhode Island and Maine. On the other
hand, we see the West Coast (California, Oregon and Washington) as more culturally similarly
than Green and Silk’s categories of Pacific (California, Hawaii and Nevada) and Northwest
(Washington, Oregon and Alaska).
103
See the listing in Appendix A.
101
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Nonetheless, some regional patterns are more complex. The most intensely
conflicted part of the country, culturally as well politically, is almost certainly the
mid-West.104 These states split between Bush and Kerry and, as the Green and Silk
comparison of Ohio and Michigan indicates, they often involve distinct attitudes
and values even among demographically similar voters.105 Moreover, it is clearly
a mistake to assume that even solidly “red” parts of the country are uniform. The
top three states, in terms of percentage of the population voting for Bush, were
Utah (71%), Wyoming (69%) and Idaho (68%)—all three heavily rural mountain
west states with influential Mormon communities, and relatively few AfricanAmericans or Latinos. They differ significantly from other mountain west states
(Montana 59%, Arizona 55%, Colorado 52%, Nevada 50% and New Mexico 50%)
both in the depth of Republican support and in demographic and cultural
characteristics. Moreover, the South and the border states, though more
consistently “red” in terms of voting patterns, include large African-American
populations, who support the moral values political agenda to a higher degree than
other Democratic voters, and vote Democratic to a greater degree than other deeply
religious voters. Nonetheless, the South and the border states have at least as
distinctive a culture as New England or the mid-Atlantic states, and they are as
solidly (if not more) Republican than the New England and mid-Atlantic states are
Democratic even if their voting patterns are less monolithic than those of Utah,
Idaho or Wyoming.106
B. Moral Values or Moral Panic?
If any social changes have inspired widespread cultural alarm and legal
responses, they are the growth in non-marital births and divorce. Both correlate
with the age at which the mother marries or becomes pregnant. In turn, if any
characteristic correlates with the new middle class morality, it is later age of
childrearing. We therefore identify age of significant life events as an important
marker of regional variation. In this section, we examine whether the regional
variations that influenced election returns also affect patterns of family
formation.
1. Teens

104

Green and Silk, supra note __, identify the Midwestern states as Indiana, Iowa, Illinois,
Kansas, Michigan, Minnesota, Nebraska, North Dakota, Ohio, South Dakota, and Wisconsin.
105
Id. Green and Silk noted that despite their demographic and economic similarities and
geographic proximity, even church going evangelicals in Michigan were less likely to list moral
values as a prime concern than in Ohio, and they were correspondingly less likely to vote for
Bush.
106
Virginia, with 54% voting for Bush, was the least Republican of Southern states, while only
49% of New Hampshire (New England) or Pennsylvania (mid-Atlantic) voted for Kerry. We
define the South as North Carolina, South Carolina, Virginia, Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi,
Louisiana and Florida. We define the Border states as West Virginia, Kentucky, Tennessee,
Oklahoma, and Arkansas. We view Texas as part of the Southwest, given its large Latino
population, and Missouri as part of the Midwest, largely because of its larger urban population.
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We start with an examination of teen sexuality, evaluating the teen
pregnancy, birth and abortion rates. The strongest indicators of cultural
divergence involve the response to managing early sexual experience, and
readiness for family formation.
a. Pregnancy rates
The highest teen pregnancy rates were in Nevada, Arizona, Mississippi,
New Mexico and Texas, all red states, though New Mexico and Nevada were
battleground areas.107 The lowest rates were in North Dakota, Maine, Vermont,
New Hampshire, Minnesota and Maine, all blue except North Dakota, with New
Hampshire as contested turf.108
b. Abortion rates
Abortion ratios, defined as the number of abortions for every 1000
births, complement the picture of regional variation. The states with the five
highest ratios for teens are New Jersey, New York, Massachusetts, Connecticut,
and Maryland, all red states from the New England or mid-Atlantic regions.109
The states with the lowest teen abortion ratios are Kentucky, Louisiana,
Arkansas, South Dakota, Oklahoma and West Virginia. With the exception of
South Dakota, they are all Southern or border states.110
c. Teen birth rates
Teen birth rates are measured in terms of the number of births per
thousand female teens in the population. The birth rates reflect the level of
sexual activity offset by access to contraception and abortion. The five states111
with the lowest rates of teen births are all concentrated in the Northeast and all
voted for Kerry: New Hampshire,112 Vermont, Massachusetts, Connecticut, and
Maine. In contrast; the five states with the highest teen birth rates are all red
and are all in the South or the Southwest: Texas, New Mexico, Mississippi,
107

GUTTMACHER INSTIT., U.S. TEEN PREGNANCY STATISTICS, NATIONAL AND STATE TRENDS BY
RACE AND ETHNICITY 11 (2006) (hereinafter referred to Guttmacher).
108
Id.
109
As discussed in the section on parental notification statutes, these states, other than
Massachusetts, have fewer restrictions on teen abortions than do virtually all of the red states.
110
Guttmacher, supra, at 11. If we were to measure abortion rates as opposed to ratios, New
Jersey, New York and Maryland would remain in the top five, but Massachusetts and
Connecticut would be replaced by Nevada and California. Id. The lowest abortion rates would
change more with the five lowest states: Utah, South Dakota, North Dakota, Kentucky and West
Virginia. Utah, North Dakota and South Dakota also have relatively low teen pregnancy rates
compared with the states Kentucky and West Virginia or the states with higher abortion ratios.
111
To make the analysis more cogent, we focus on the highest and lowest five states in each
category
112
New Hampshire, unlike the others, however, was so close that it could be more accurately
described as “purple.” See note __ , supra.
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Arizona, and Arkansas.113 Moreover, as a general matter, while teen birth rates
have declined for the country as a whole, they have fallen much more rapidly in
New England than elsewhere. Whereas mid-Western states such as Iowa and
Minnesota had some of the lowest teen birth rates in the country in 1988, their
rates have stayed relatively stable while those in the Northeast have plunged.
The high teen birth states have, in contrast, seen relatively little decline over the
last twenty years.114
These figures reflect not just political patterns but also racial
demographics. In Texas, Arizona and “purple” New Mexico, significantly
more than half of the teen births were to Hispanics.115 The majority of children
born to teenagers in Arkansas and Mississippi were white, but AfricanAmericans constitute a significant percentage of the overall totals. Taking just
whites into account, the top teen birth rates would have been concentrated in the
border states and the South: Arkansas, Kentucky, Mississippi, Oklahoma and
Tennessee.116 The lowest rates for whites were in New Jersey, Connecticut,
Massachusetts, New York and Rhode Island.
The pattern for African-Americans is a little harder to gauge. The states
with the lowest African-American teen birth rates are New Hampshire, Utah,
New York, and Rhode Island, with California, Massachusetts, and New Mexico
tied for fifth. New Hampshire (under 1%), New Mexico (under 2%), and Utah
(2%) have such small African-American populations as to make analysis
difficult. The states with the highest rates of African-American births are not
concentrated by region, and include Wisconsin, Arkansas, Illinois, Mississippi
and Ohio. Accordingly, the low overall state teen birth rates for the states in the
upper part of New England may reflect a lack of diversity, 117 and the high rates
in the Southwest may reflect the percentage of Latinos.118 Nonetheless, the teen
113

CHILD TRENDS DATABANK, TEEN BIRTH RATES RANKED LOWEST TO HIGHEST (2003)
http://www.childtrendsdatabank.org/pdf/13_PDF.pdf. In 1988, by contrast, the lowest teen birth
rates would have in Minnesota, North Dakota, Massachusetts, Iowa, New Hampshire and
Vermont while the highest rates would have been in Mississippi, New Mexico, Arkansas, Texas
and Arizona. The relative changes involve a steady decline in teen birth rates in New England
compared to stable rates in the upper Midwest.
114
Id. at 13.
115
See Guttmacher. supra note __. Hispanic voters are relatively conservative on values issues,
but more likely to vote Democratic than whites with similar concerns.
116
Id.
117
Whites who are not of Hispanic or Latino origin constitute 69% of the U.S. total, but 96.5%
of the population of Maine, 96.2% in Vermont, and 95.1% of New Hampshire. These rates fall
to 81.9% in Mass., and 77.4% in Connecticut. In the core mid-Atlantic states of New York and
New Jersey, in contrast, whites constitute 62% and 66% of the population respectively.
Mapping Census 2000: The Geography of U.S. Diversity, U.S. Census Bureau, December 7,
2001, last revised 2/27/02.
118
Latinos constitute 42% of the population of New Mexico, 32.4% of California, 32% of
Texas, and 25% of Arizona. Moreover, since the Latino population in these states is
substantially younger than the white population, and fertility rates are higher, the effect on the
teen birth rate is substantial. Id.
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births for whites alone diverge most between the core northeastern states and the
southern states.
d. Marital and non-marital rates
A comparison of marital versus non-marital teen births completes the
data on overall births. The states with the highest percent of teen births to
unmarried mothers are Massachusetts (only 8% of teen births are marital),
Delaware, Pennsylvania, and Rhode Island (9%), and Connecticut and Maryland
(10%),119 all blue states and states with relatively low teen birth rates.120 The
states with the highest percentages of teen births taking place within marriage
are Idaho, where 36% of teen births are marital, Utah, with 34%, Texas, with
27%, and Colorado, Kentucky, and Wyoming, each with 26%.121 Not only are
all of these states red, but Utah, Wyoming and Idaho produced the highest
percentage of Republican voters in 2004 of any states in the union.
e. Summary
These data establish that the “blue states” of the Northeast and the midAtlantic have lower teen birth rates, higher use of abortion, and lower
percentages of teen births within marriage, while a second set of “red states”
concentrated in the South and the Southern border tend to have higher teen birth
rates, fewer abortions, and a higher percentage of teen births occurring with
marriage.122 The first set of states effectively discourages teen childbearing,
with abortion as an established fallback.123 Those teens who do give birth,
however, may either feel little pressure or have little opportunity to marry. In
the second set of states, where teen birth rates are higher and more of them are
within marriage, family formation begins at earlier ages. The higher birth rates
may thus reflect either more intentional births within marriage or greater
reliance on shot gun marriages rather than abortion to deal with accidental

119

Id.
Indeed, Massachusetts and Rhode Island are the two “bluest” states, Maryland is fifth, and
Connecticut is tied for sixth. See Appendix A.
121
Facts at a Glance, CHILDTRENDS, Publication ##2006-03, Table 1 (2006),
http://www.childtrends.org/Files/FAAG2006.pdf
122
Vermont, New Hampshire, and Maine, among the states with the lowest teen birth rate, also
had high percentages of nonmarital teen births: in Vermont, it was 87%, New Hampshire 89%,
and Maine 88%. Id. The percent of births to teen mothers with respect to all births in the state
was highest in New Mexico (17%), followed by Mississippi (16%), Arkansas and Louisiana
(15%), and Alabama and Oklahoma (14%). Id. The lowest percentages were in Massachusetts,
New Hampshire, New Jersey and Vermont (6%), and Connecticut, Minnesota, New York, and
Utah (7%). Id.
123
Teen pregnancy, as opposed to birth rates, suggest a somewhat different regional distribution.
The lowest teen pregnancy rates were in North Dakota, Vermont, New Hampshire, Minnesota
and Maine. Guttmacher, supra note __, at 11. The states with the highest teen pregnancy rates
were Nevada, Arizona, Mississippi and Texas. Id..
120
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pregnancies.124
2. The relationship of age, marriage, and divorce
The relative age of marriage can be expected to complement the regional
variations evident in the birth figures, and it does. The age of legal marriage in
most states is 18. In the United States as a whole, the median age of marriage
for women is 25.1, while for men it is 26.7.125 This has changed dramatically
since 1960, when the median age at first marriage was 20.3 for women, and 22.8
for men.126 The five states with the lowest median age of marriage are red
states: Utah, Oklahoma, Idaho, Arkansas, and Kentucky, states that also have
relatively high teen birth and/or low abortion rates.127 Correspondingly, the
states with the highest median age of marriage are blue: Massachusetts, New
York, Rhode Island, Connecticut, and New Jersey.
Age of first birth corresponds with the marriage figures. In 2000, the
mean age of the mother at her first live birth for the country as a whole was
24.9; Massachusetts had the highest mean age, at 27.8, followed by Connecticut
(27.2), New Jersey (27.1), New Hampshire (26.7), and New York (26.4). In
contrast, Mississippi had the lowest (22.5), followed by Arkansas (22.7),
Louisiana and New Mexico (23.0), Oklahoma (23.1), and Wyoming (23.2).128
Over the past thirty years, all states have experienced an increase in the mean
age of mothers at which the first child is born, but the changes range from a 5.3
year increase in Massachusetts to a 1.9 year increase in Utah.129 With the
highest rates of change concentrated in the northeast and mid-Atlantic states,
and the smallest rates of change in the states with the lowest average ages of
birth, the gap between the states is growing.130
124

Race seems to play more of a role in the abortion ratios than in overall birth rates. New
York, New Jersey and Maryland all report more African-American pregnancies and births
among African-Americans than among white teens. The New England states, however, with
even lower teen birth rates, have significantly smaller percentages of African-Americans and
lower abortion rates than the mid-Atlantic states. Guttmacher, supra, at 11. Moreover, whereas
in 1988, California and Hawaii ranks 1 and 2 in abortion rates, today those states have fallen out
of the top five, and been replaced by mid-Atlantic states with higher African-American
populations. Id. African-Americans nationally have substantially greater teen abortion rates
and ratios than whites. Id. at 4.
125
Tallese Johnson and Jane Dye, INDICATORS OF MARRIAGE AND FERTILITY IN THE UNITED
STATES FROM THE AMERICAN COMMUNITY SURVEY: 2000 TO 2003, Table 1 (2005),
http://www.census.gov/population/www/socdemo/fertility/mar-fert-slides.html.
126
Infoplease, Median Age at First Marriage, INFORMATION PLEASE DATABASE (2007),
http://www.infoplease.com/ipa/A0005061.html. On the other hand, in 1890, the median age of
first marriage for men was 26.1, and 22.0 for women.
127
See supra note. ___.
128
T.J. Mathews and Brady E. Hamilton, Mean Age of Mother, 1970-2000, 51 NAT’L VITAL
STAT. REP. 1, 10 (Table 3) (2002), http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr51/nvsr51_01.pdf.
129
Id.
130
Id. Looking at just the 1990’s, however, the areas with the biggest jump in age of first birth
were D.C., Massachusetts, Michigan, New Hampshire and New Jersey, North Carolina and
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The states with the highest divorce rates in 2004 were Nevada,131
Arkansas, Wyoming, Idaho, and Kentucky, while those with the lowest are
primarily, though not entirely, blue states, with Massachusetts, followed by
Pennsylvania, North Dakota, Illinois, and Connecticut.132 Divorce rates vary
with the number of people marrying, particularly as those most at risk for
divorce become increasingly less likely to marry at all. Nonetheless, divorce
risk also increases with younger age of marriage, lower economic status, and
having a baby either prior to marriage or within the first seven months after
marriage.133 Accordingly, family strategies that either emphasize marrying
young, or marriage as the solution to an improvident pregnancy are likely to
increase rates of divorce, all other things being equal. Later ages of marriage
and first births, however, lower overall fertility. Unsurprisingly, therefore, the
percent of childless women is highest in the Northeast states, and lowest in the
southern states.134 The nineteen states with the highest fertility rates are red,
while the sixteen states with the lowest fertility rates are blue.135
Virginia. The states with the least change were Wyoming and Alaska, which showed declines in
age, New Mexico, which stayed the same, and South Dakota and North Dakota. Id.
131
Nevada’s divorce rate, like its marriage rate, however, most likely reflects its tradition of
relatively lax residency requirements.
132
The CDC figures on divorce rates, which include rates for every one of the five years from
1999 to 2004, provide a better sense of patterns over time than the census figures. These tables
also show the states with the highest divorce rates as Nevada, Arkansas, Wyoming, and Idaho,
with West Virginia and Alabama ahead of Kentucky over the five year period. The CDC tallies
include Massachusetts, Illinois, and Pennsylvania in the top five, but show New Jersey and
Wisconsin with more consistently low rates than North Dakota or Connecticut. Division of
Vital Stat., Nat’l Center for Health Stat., Center for Disease Control, Divorce Rates by State:
1990, 1995, and 1999-2004 (2005), http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvss/divorce90_04.pdf
133
Paul R. Amato and Stacy J. Rogers, A Longitudinal Study of Marital Problems and
Subsequent Divorce, 59 JOURNAL OF MARRIAGE AND THE FAMILY 612, 621 (1997); A. Booth
and J. Edwards, Age at Marriage and Marital Instability, 47 J. OF MARRIAGE AND THE FAMILY
67-95 (1985); BARBARA DAFOE WHITEHEAD AND DAVID POPENOE, STATE OF OUR UNIONS: THE
SOCIAL HEALTH OF MARRIAGE IN AMERICA Box 2 (2004),
http://marriage.rutgers.edu/Publications/SOOU/TEXTSOOU2004.htm#Divorce.
134
Jane Lawler Dye, Fertility of American Women: June 2004, 20-555 CURRENT POPULATION
REP. 1, 4,table 2 (2005), http://www.census.gov/prod/2005pubs/p20-555.pdf. It was 48% in the
northeast, which includes Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Massachusetts, Rhode Island,
Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania; and 42.5% in the south, which included
Delaware, Maryland, DC, Virginia, West Virgina, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia,
Florida, Kentucky, Tennessee, Alabama, Mississippi, Arkansas, Louisiana, Oklahoma, and
Texas. The statistics did not include a further breakdown by state.
135
Steve Sailer, Birth Gap: How Birthrates Color the Electoral Map, THE AM. CONSERVATIVE,
Dec. 2004, http://www.amconmag.com/2004_12_06/cover.html.
In the United States, there are 1,182 children born for every 1,000 women. U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU TABLE S1. FERTILITY INDICATORS FOR WOMEN 15 TO 44 YEARS OLD BY STATE OF
RESIDENCE: JUNE 2004, (2004), http://www.census.gov/population/socdemo/fertility/tabS1.xls.
D.C. is, once again, an outlier, with a fertility rate of 776. States with the lowest fertility rates
for never-married women were mixed, with Utah, a red state, with the lowest rate of 208,
followed by Delaware (213), Minnesota (234), North Dakota (241), Idaho (247), and New
Hampshire (254). Id. Alaska has the highest fertility rate, with 1,435 children born per 1,000
women, followed by Arkansas (1,418), Utah and Mississippi (1,393), and South Dakota (1,368).
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Adult abortion rates correlate with lower birth rates. The states with the
highest abortion ratios – the number of abortions per 1,000 live births to women
between the ages of 15-44 – were New York, Delaware, Washington,
Massachusetts, and Connecticut.136 They each had a ratio of over 300. The
states with the lowest abortion ratios, with rates under 100, were Colorado,
Utah, Idaho, and South Dakota. Kentucky was fifth with a ratio slightly over
100.137 Similarly, states with the lowest abortion rates were Colorado, Utah,
Idaho, Kentucky, and South Dakota, while those with the highest abortion rates
were New York, Delaware, Washington, New Jersey, and Rhode Island.138
The abortion rates show a slightly different regional emphasis from the
birth rates discussed earlier, although the blue state tilt remains unchanged.
The less diverse, upper New England states of Vermont and New Hampshire do
not appear on the lists of states with the highest abortion rates, replaced by west
coast Washington,139 and more of the mid-Atlantic states: New York, New
Jersey, and Delaware. The states with the lowest abortion rates are largely from
the less diverse mountain states and upper Midwest (Colorado, Utah, Idaho, and
South Dakota), largely excluding the South with the exception of Kentucky.140
Abortion rates accordingly replicate red-blue, if not always Northeast-South,
patterns of division.
Finally, a consideration of household composition again reflects a
general, if less uniform, red-blue state replication. The states with the highest
rates of unmarried partners are Maine (7.3), New Hampshire (7.2), Vermont
(7.1), Alaska (6.6), and tied for fifth, Arizona and Nevada (6.3). The states
reporting the fewest unmarried partners are Alabama (3.0), Utah (3.4), Arkansas
(3.6), Mississippi (3.8), with Kentucky and Kansas (4.0) tied for fifth.141 .
The states with the lowest fertility rates are: Maryland (991), Vermont (1,000), Massachusetts
(1,020), Maine (1,022), and Delaware (1,023). Id. Unsurprisingly, the states with the highest
percentages of childless women track the fertility rates: Vermont (53.5%), Massachusetts (51.2),
Delaware (49.1), New York (48.5), and Maine (48.2)—all blue. The states with the lowest
percentages of childless women are Arkansas (35.3%), Mississippi (35.4), Alaska (38.0),
Alabama (38.7) and Georgia (39.3)—all red Id..
136
Laurie D. Elam-Evans et al., Abortion Surveillance, United States, 2000, 52
SURVEILLENANCE SUMMARIES 1, 29 Table 3 (2003),
http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/ss5212a1.htm.
137
Id. Florida and Louisiana had low rates as well, but did not report the number of abortions
with respect to in-state residents. Id.
138
Id. States with incomplete measures of were again excluded, as was the District of
Columbia.
139
Washington, while more diverse than the upper New England states, was still 78.9% white,
with only 3% African-Americans. CYNTHIA A. BREWER AND TRUDY A. SUCHAN, MAPPING
CENSUS 2000: THE GEOGRAPHY OF U.S. DIVERSITY, U.S. Census Bureau (2001)
140
These data were also less complete than others, with a number of Southern states missing
from the tables.
141
U.S. Census Bureau, American Community Survey, supra note __, at Table 2. Non-marital
birth rates, in contrast, seem to be largely a reflection of race, religious and ethnic patterns. The
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C. A Cultural Snapshot
The demographic data supports the emergence of two strikingly different
life cycle patterns in the United States, patterns that are correlated with a state’s
political votes in the 2004 U.S. presidential election. The patterns reflect
different understandings about family formation, with prominent differences in
age of marriage and first birth, teen childbearing and abortion rates, and overall
levels of marriage, divorce and fertility. Our evaluation of this picture does not
purport, however, to address causation. That is, we have made no effort to say
that a pregnant nineteen-year old is choosing to conceive and bear a child
because she lives in Mississippi rather than Massachusetts.142
Instead, we have tried to sketch a regional snapshot of cultural
differences. We believe that the milieu in which legal issues are decided and the
worldviews voters bring to the ballot box frame the family law questions of our
era. Accordingly, we emphasize that these issues take on different symbolic
meaning if young adults characteristically marry at 22 rather than 32, and if teen
pregnancy is a routine pathway to marriage rather than an inopportune event to
be managed. Moreover, we suspect that political attitudes might well vary in
states where over half the population lives in married couple households versus
those where household patterns are more diverse. We maintain that even if
regional differences reflect an amalgam of income, class, and cultural origins,
they nonetheless frame family law decision-making.143
states with the lowest birth rates to never married mothers are Utah (208 per 1000 women of
child-bearing age), Vermont (213), Minnesota (234), North Dakota (241) and Idaho (247).
These states, a mix of red and blue, have relatively little diversity U.S. Census Bureau, Fertility
of American Women, supra. If we were to consider only the birthrates to unmarried women
from 2000 to 2003, however, we would pick up Colorado and New Jersey in the top ten, states
with considerably more diverse populations. American Community Survey, supra. The states
with the highest birth rates to never married mothers are Mississippi (690), Georgia (678),
Michigan (600), Alabama (570), and Alaska (556). U.S. Census Bureau, Fertility of American
Women, supra. If we were to look instead at recent births, the top five would be Mississippi,
Louisiana, South Carolina, New Mexico and Alabama. Indicators of Marriage, supra.
142
We have not used regression analyses to control for income (blue states are wealthier),
religion (Baptists dominate in much of the south, Lutherans in the upper mid-west, etc.), rural v.
urban living or ethnicity to any comprehensive degree. In addition, while we believe that these
data show striking regional variations in consequences – divorce rates, fertility, and non-marital
birth rates – we believe that any normative assessment of consequences does require regression
analyses that control for income, race and ethnicity, and economic opportunity.
Moreover, there are data which show somewhat less polarization between red and blue
states than in the picture we have painted in this section, such as the data on marital household
composition by state. We are trying to show general patterns, but certainly acknowledge that
not all lifestyle choices differ dramatically between red and blue states, or, indeed, among all red
and blue states.
143
We will amplify on this point below, but we argue that unlike social science analysis, our
object here is not to isolate causation of sociological events. Instead, we wish to depict a
process of cultural changes that makes legal innovations more or less acceptable. We will argue
therefore the critical question is not to what degree younger age of marriage, for example,
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IV. FAMILY LAW AND FAMILY VALUES
The most striking feature in the data above involves what
Barbara Dafoe Whitehead has called “different pathways to adulthood.”144
Traditional family rearing practices supervised daughters’ chastity from their
parents’ homes into marriage. The new blue state system allows for a
substantial period of independence – and sexual experimentation – before
assumption of adult responsibilities. How does the law, which does not directly
address the transition to adulthood outside setting an age of majority, address
these issues?
The legal age of marriage is fairly consistent throughout the
United States, so something other than the age of consent must be responsible
for the median age variations of marriage between different regions. The
conflict between the two systems focuses instead on the symbolic: on public
reinforcement of private understandings of appropriate behavior.
In this section, we contrast two distinct types of legal decisionmaking. First, we consider legislative action addressing two symbolic
flashpoints in the culture wars: parental consent to abortion, and same-sex
marriage.145 These “wedge” issues, though they have changed somewhat over
time, involve political mobilization to pass legislation that affects relatively few
people, albeit in often destructive ways. We contrast red state and blue states
attitudes and strategies toward these issues.
Second, we explore case law in the less publicized arenas of the
role of non-marital cohabitation in custody decisionmaking. Here, while red
states and blue states vary in their approaches to these issues, courts, unlike
legislatures, have greater ability to finesse cultural conflict. We suggest that the
differences between legislative and judicial action provide models for diffusing
rather than inflaming cultural tensions. We end by considering the implications
of family law polarization for a federal system.
reflects ethnic composition – African-Americans and Latinos clearly start families at younger
ages – but to what degree voter willingness to assist those bearing children at younger ages
reflects cultural norms. See infra TAN __.
144
See Whitehead, supra note __.
145
There are, of course, other laws which show similar trends, such as those related to parental
leave. The states that provide the most comprehensive job protection to employees who take a
leave for either family or medical reasons are California, Hawaii, Oregon, Connecticut, New
Jersey, Washington, Maine, Vermont, Minnesota, Rhode Island, Massachusetts, Louisiana,
Wisconsin, New Hampshire, New York, and Tennessee (there are only 2 red states in the top
16). JODI GRANT, TAYLOR HATCHER AND NIRALI PATEL, NAT’L PARTNERSHIP FOR WOMEN AND
FAMILIES, EXPECTING BETTER: A STATE-BY-STATE ANALYSIS OF PARENTAL LEAVE PROGRAMS
15 (2005),
http://www.nationalpartnership.org/portals/p3/library/PaidLeave/ParentalLeaveReportMay05.pd
f.We leave a fuller discussion of these and similar to our forthcoming book.
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A. Parental Authority or Teen Autonomy?
If regulation of teen sexuality is a critical factor in the transition to
adulthood, then the allocation of decision-making authority in this realm is
likely to be a symbolic flashpoint. The struggle between proponents of
abstinence education and comprehensive sex education, for example, is a
dramatic illustration of this flashpoint.146 Here, we address what we believe to
be a central battlefield in the cultural war: parental notification as a prerequisite
for teen abortion.
Roe v. Wade,147 the Supreme Court decision, upholding a woman’s right
to an abortion over state prohibitions, has been one of the most divisive issues of
the era since it was decided in 1973. Political candidates have repeatedly
vowed to support an abortion ban, and Congress and state legislatures have
adopted a series of measures designed to undermine access.148 Moreover,
private campaigns to picket, threaten and in some cases attack abortion
providers have effectively limited its availability in many areas. In South
Dakota, for example, one of the most hostile states to abortion efforts, only one
provider remains, and that clinic stays open only with the assistance of out-ofstate doctors who fly into Sioux Falls once a week.149
Nonetheless, the issue of parental consent to teen abortions takes on
particular salience in the cultural conflict between family systems. On the one
hand, the idea that parents should be involved in a decision concerning a minor
child has intuitive appeal. Moreover, advocates emphasize the benefits of
improved parent-teen communication,150 including protection of sexually active
teens from predatory partners. New Hampshire, for example, justified its
parental notification statute as serving “several compelling state interests,
including protecting the emotional and physical health of the pregnant mother,
vindicating the importance of the parent-child relationship, and promoting the
family unit.”151 Senators who enacted interstate parental notification measures
146

Kristin Luker provides a telling cultural account of the abstinence education battles, KRISTIN
LUKER, WHEN SEX GOES TO SCHOOL: WARRING VIEWS ON SEX -- AND SEX EDUCATION -- SINCE
THE SIXTIES (2006).
147
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
148
See, e.g., the federal Partial Birth Abortion Ban upheld in Gonzales v. Carhart, 127 S. Ct.
1610 (2007).
149

Two other states have only one abortion provider: North Dakota and Louisiana. Evelyn
Nieves, S.D. Makes Abortion Rare Through Laws And Stigma: Out-of-State Doctors Come
Weekly to 1 Clinic, Wash. Post, Tuesday, December 27, 2005, at A01.

150

E.g., Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 895 (1992); Hodgson v.
Minnesota, 497 U.S. at 417 (1990).
151
Brief for Petitioners at 10-12, Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood, 546 U.S. 320 (2006). Professor
Teresa Collett notes that parental notification laws can benefit minors through improving
medical care and providing protection from sexual assault. Teresa Stanton Collett, Protecting
Our Daughters: The Need for Parental Notification Laws, 26 VT. L. REV. 101, 102 (2001).
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in 2006 “conjured up images of lascivious older men ferrying off their sexual
prey to out-of-state abortion clinics”152 and emphasized the importance of
parent-child communication.153 At the core of the issue – both as a cultural and
constitutional matter – is deference to parental authority.154
On the other hand, empirical studies show that teens overwhelmingly do
consult their parents when they elect to have abortions.155 Opposition to
mandatory parental involvement focuses on the reasons a minority does not, and
the potential effect on the timing of abortions. An early study by Planned
Parenthood found that of those minors who did not inform their parents of their
abortions, 30 percent had histories of violence in their families, feared the
occurrence of violence, or were afraid of being kicked out of their homes.156
Other studies find that parental notification laws delay medical treatment,
turning otherwise routine abortions into riskier procedures.157 Moreover,
152

Collett, Parental Notification, supra note __.
For a comprehensive statement of the benefits of parental notification laws, including claims
that such law help reduce teen pregnancy, see Teresa Stanton Collett, Transporting Minors For
Immoral Purposes: The Case For The Child Custody Protection Act & The Child Interstate
Abortion Notification Act, 16 HEALTH MATRIX 107 (2006). For a discussion of the
methodological issues underlying such claims, see THEODORE JOYCE, SILVIE COLMAN AND
ROBERT KAESTNER, METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES IN THE EVALUATION OF PARENTAL
INVOLVEMENT LAWS: EVIDENCE FROM TEXAS (2006)
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=929171
154
See GEORGE LAKOFF, MORAL POLITICS: HOW LIBERALS AND CONSERVATIVES THINK
(2002); DON’T THINK OF AN ELEPHANT: KNOW YOUR VALUES AND FRAME THE DEBATE (2004).
Professors Robert Post and Reva Siegel note more generally that “[t]he antiabortion backlash
that has so traumatized liberals reflects a constitutional vision that would preserve traditional
family roles and resist secularization of the American state.” Post and Seigel, supra note __, at
55.
155
See, e.g., Caroline A. Placey, Comment, Of Judicial Bypass Procedures, Moral Recual, and
Protected Political Speech: Throwing Pregnancy Minors Under the Campaign Bus, 56 EMORY
L. J. 693, 703-04 (2006); Posting of Professor Kimberly Murcherson to
http://www.legalaffairs.org/webexclusive/debateclub_parental-notification0306.msp.
156
Stanley K. Henshaw, and Kathryn Kost, Parental Involvement in Minors' Abortion
Decisions, 24 FAMILY PLANNING PERSPECTIVES, 196, 213(Sept.-Oct., 1992).
157
For example, the American Association of University Women maintains that: "While the
intent of such laws is to enhance family communication, the failure to guarantee confidentiality
often deters young people from seeking timely services and care resulting in increased instances
of sexually transmitted diseases, unwanted pregnancies, and late term abortions." Auriana
Ojeda, Should Abortion Rights Be Restricted?: Introduction, enotes.com (2002)
<http://www.enotes.com/should-abortion-article/39731>.; see also Rachel N. Pine, Speculation
and Reality: The Role of Facts in Judicial Protection of Fundamental Rights, 136 U. PA. L. REV.
655, 677-90 (1987) (summarizing research that shows ineffective parent-teen communications
about matters of sexuality and that assumptions underlying parental notification laws are
unrealistic). In Hodgson v. Minnesota, the trial court, after a lengthy hearing on implication of
that state’s parental notification law, found that:
the two-parent notification requirement had particularly harmful effects on both the minor and
the custodial parent when the parents were divorced or separated, especially in the context of an
abusive or dysfunctional family; that the requirement also had adverse effects in families in
which the minor lives with both parents, particularly where family violence is a serious problem;
that the requirement actually impairs family communication in many instances, since minors
153
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opponents maintain that in the polarized climate of abortion politics, such laws
are often intended to frustrate access to abortion services altogether.158
In the period immediately following Roe v. Wade, parental involvement
laws swept the country.159 By 1988, over twenty states had enacted legislation,
though about half were subject to court orders enjoining their enforcement.160
Relatively liberal Massachusetts enacted one of the first (and strictest) statutes
in 1974.161 Today, forty-four states have at one time or another enacted such
laws, and thirty-five states have them in force.162 Although initially neither
abortion nor parental notification laws split the states along lines of red
state/blue state polarization, more recent developments do, in fact, echo this
split.163
The litigation over the constitutionality of the laws captures some of the
shift. In 1976, the Supreme Court first considered parental involvement laws,
striking down a Missouri statute that required parental consent, unless the
abortion was necessary to save the life of the child.164 In subsequent cases, the
Court has upheld statutes requiring parental consent, so long as they include a
judicial bypass procedure that would allow a mature minor to make her own
abortion decision, or that would permit an abortion to occur if it were in the
child’s best interest.165
These early cases balanced protection of the
constitutional right to abortion with the recognition ordinarily granted to
who otherwise would inform one parent were unwilling to do so when such notification would
involve going to court for a bypass in any event; that few minors can take advantage of the
abuse exception because of the obligation to report the information to the authorities and the
attendant loss of privacy; and that the two-parent requirement did not further the State's interests
in protecting pregnant minors or assuring family integrity.
Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 421 (1990).
158
See Carol Sanger, Regulating Teenage Abortion in the United States: Politics and Policy, 18
INT'L J.L. POL'Y & FAM. 305 (2004) (statutes serve, inter alia, to make access to abortion more
difficult for minors).
159
For further discussion of the Roe backlash, see Robert Post and Reva Siegel, Roe Rage:
Democratic Constitutionalism and Backlash, 42 HARV. C.R.-C.L. REV. ___ (forthcoming 2007)
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=990968.
160
Theresa N. Walker, Note, California's Parental Consent Statute: A Constitutional Challenge,
40 HASTINGS L.J. 169, 169 n. 4 (1988) (23 states had enacted either parental notification or
consent laws; 9 were subject to injunction and 3 had been declared unconstitutional.)
161
Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 112, § 12P (2003). The Massachusetts statute required the
consent, not just the notification, of both parents.
162
Planned Parenthood, Laws Requiring Parental Consent or Notification for Minors.
http://www.plannedparenthood.org/news-articles-press/politics-policy-issues/teen-pregnancysex-education/consent-law-6132.htm
163
See H.W. Perry, Jr. and L.A. Powe, Jr , The Political Battle for the Constitution, , 21 CONST.
COMMENTARY 641 (2004)(summarizing the political shifts and timing the start of the political
polarization on the issue to the Reagan years). See also Post and Siegel, supra note ___, at 55
(summarizing research on the anti-abortion movement and concluding that opposition to Roe
was largely a Catholic effort in the seventies and early eighties, and that evangelicals and
mainstream Protestants did not initially view abortion as an important issue).
164
Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
165
Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 899-900 (1992).
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parents’ interest in supervising their teens. In the Court’s 1976 decision in
Bellotti v. Baird,166 for example, which struck down the Massachusetts statute,
Justice Powell observed that the abortion decision was crucial to a minor’s
future, and that the state must have important interests when seeking to restrict a
minor’s choice.167 In contrast to later decisions, the Court in Bellotti focused
on the right to an abortion, the potential impact of parental notification on
deterring abortion, and what it clearly viewed as the negative consequences,
“grave and indelible,” of “unwanted motherhood” balanced against the parental
interest in supervising their children.168
By 1990, however, the Court had become warier of overturning state
decisions, and it fractured in Hodgson v. Minnesota,169 overturning a two-parent
involvement law that Justice Powell described as one of the strictest in the
country,170 but doing so in a plurality opinion later courts would find
incomprehensible.171 In the Supreme Court’s most recent parental involvement
decision, Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of New England,172 the Court declined
to invalidate a New Hampshire statute on its face that required parental
166

Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979).
He noted:
We are concerned here with a constitutional right to seek an abortion. The abortion
decision differs in important ways from other decisions that may be made during minority.
The need to preserve the constitutional right and the unique nature of the abortion
decision, especially when made by a minor, require a State to act with particular sensitivity
when it legislates to foster parental involvement in this matter . . . . Indeed, considering her
probable education, employment skills, financial resources, and emotional maturity,
unwanted motherhood may be exceptionally burdensome for a minor . . . . In sum, there
are few situations in which denying a minor the right to make an important decision will
have consequences so grave and indelible.
Id. at 642.
168
Justice Powell observed that: "Properly understood . . . the tradition of parental authority is
not inconsistent with our tradition of individual liberty; rather, the former is one of the basic
presuppositions of the latter. Legal restrictions on minors, especially those supportive of the
parental role, may be important to the child's chances for the full growth and maturity that make
eventual participation in a free society meaningful and rewarding." Bellotti II, 443 U.S. at 638639 (opinion of Powell, J.).
169
Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417 (1990),
170
Stevens wrote that “Minnesota['s] statute is the most intrusive in the Nation" because it is the
only state - of the thirty-eight which require some form of participation by the minor's parents to specifically mandate that both parents of the pregnant woman consent to the abortion. Id. at
425 n.5 (discussing the varying requirements from state to state for a woman who seeks an
abortion). Many of the individual justices joined the other justices in part with six upholding the
constitutionality of single parent notification with judicial bypass procedures, and five
upholding the constitutionality of two parent notification with sufficient judicial bypass
safeguards. The trial court, in Hodgson, however, in addition to its findings that the two parent
notification served no rational state purpose, also found bypass procedures to be terrifying to the
petitioners, with many judges concluding that they were pointless. Id. at
171
See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Camblos, 155 F.3d 352 (4th Cir. 1998). "The Court in
Hodgson was so fractured as to render its opinions collectively all but impenetrable, with five
different Justices filing opinions variously concurring and dissenting in other opinions and parts
of other opinions...."
172
546 U.S. 320 (2006).
167
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notification without a judicial bypass. Instead, the Court emphasized that
relatively few applications of the statute would raise constitutional issues, and
that the Court should “try not to nullify more of a legislature’s work than is
necessary, for we know that ‘[a] ruling of unconstitutionality frustrates the intent
of the elected representatives of the people.’”173
As partisanship has intensified around the issue of abortion, the Court
has signaled that the issue is better left to the political branches of government.
In Gonzales v. Carhart,174 which upheld federal partial birth abortion
legislation, the Court reaffirmed its deference to legislative judgment. As a
result, the matter of parental involvement is now clearly in the hands of state
legislatures, with less expectation than in prior decades that the Court will police
state activity.175
In state legislatures, the red/blue division is replicated. Six states, all of
which are blue—Connecticut, Hawaii, New York, Oregon, Vermont, and
Washington—do not require any form of parental involvement in minors’
abortion decisions.177 New Hampshire, the battleground New England state,
became the first state to repeal a parental notification during the summer of
2007.178 The experience in New Hampshire emphasizes the politically polarized
nature of the issue. The 2007 repeal came after Democrats swept into office in
the 2006 election, replacing the Republican legislature that had passed strict –
and arguably unconstitutional – parental notification laws only a few years
before.179 West coast blue California and Oregon had parental notification
propositions on the ballot in 2006. California voters, who had overthrown a
similar measure in a 2005 special election, defeated the proposition again in
2006.180 Oregon defeated its parental notification proposition, which would
173

Id. at 329 (citations omitted).
Gonzales v. Carhart. 127 S. Ct. 1610 (2007).
175
See, e.g., Perry and Powe, supra note __ , observing that legislatures in the era immediately
after Roe sometimes passed legislation with the expectation that the Court would invalid it,
taking the political heat away from the legislature for the decision.
177
Planned Parenthood, Laws Requiring Parental Notification, supra note __. Connecticut
provides for counseling the teen about the possibility of parental notification, but does not
mandate it. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 19a-600 to -601 (West, 2007).
178
New Hampshire to Repeal Parental Notification Law, N. Y. TIMES, July 2, 2007.
http://select.nytimes.com/search/restricted/article?res=F20B13FB34540C7B8CDDAF0894DF40
4482.
179
Id. The Ayotte Court observed that the failure to provide an exception to the parental
notification provision to protect the life or health of the mother raised potential constitutional
issues and remanded for a determination of whether an injunction would cure the problem.
Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of New England, 546 U.S. 320 (2006).
180
The California legislature had enacted a parental involvement statute in 1987, which was
subsequently declared unconstitutional pursuant to the state’s constitutional right to privacy in
1997. See Am. Acad. of Pediatrics v. Lungren, 940 P.2d 797, 800 (Cal. 1997) (striking down
California's law because it offended the minor's right of privacy guaranteed by the California
constitution). The Proposition failed in 2006 by a vote of 46% to 54%. AMERICAVOTES2006,
CNN.COM. HTTP://WWW.CNN.COM/ELECTION/2006/PAGES/RESULTS/BALLOT.MEASURES/
174
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have changed state law allowing teens fifteen and older to obtain abortions
without parental involvement, by a similar margin.181
Some states, while mandating notification or consent, make them less of a
barrier to obtaining an abortion. The majority of these states are blue. Maine,
for example, allows a physician to override the parental involvement
requirement and permits other family members to be notified in lieu of a
parent.182 Other states have relatively broad waiver provisions, including the
blue states of Delaware and Maryland, and red West Virginia that like Maine
allow a physician to waive parental notice in the best interests of the child.183 A
few states, blue and red, have also broadened the class of adults who can
consent or to whom notice must be given in lieu of a parent.184 Finally, some
states have taken no state action the wake of older decisions invalidating
parental notification statutes.185
181

Id.
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, §§ 1597-A(2)(A)(West, 2007)
183
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 24, § 1783(a) (1997) (allowing notice to a licensed mental health
professional not associated with an abortion provider); MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 20103(c) (2007) (allowing a physician to determine that parental notice is not in the minor's best
interest); and W. VA. CODE § 16-2F-1 (stating physician not affiliated with an abortion provider
may waive the notice requirement). Kansas also permits physician waiver but only in the event
of a medical emergency. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-6705(j) (2007) (allowing a physician to bypass
parental notice in cases where the physician determines that an emergency exists that threatens
the “well-being” of the minor).
184
See, e.g., W IS. STAT. ANN. §§ 48.375(2)(b)(West, WESTLAW through 2005 Act 60)(in lieu
of parental consent, a grandparent, aunt, uncle, or sibling who is at least 25 years old may
provide consent); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2919.12 (Anderson 2007) (stating that notice may
be given to a brother, sister, step-parent, or grandparent if certain qualifications are met). Some
states broaden the class of adults to include other family members, such as grandparents, with
whom the teen is living, but we view the purpose of these laws as less about parental authority.
See Planned Parenthood, Laws Requiring Parental Notification, supra note __.
185
Planned Parenthood lists nine states where courts have issued injunctions against
enforcement of their parental notification laws. Of these states, four (California, Illinois, New
Hampshire, and New Jersey) are blue, though New Hampshire is a battleground state, and the
remaining five are red (Alaska, Idaho, Montana, New Mexico, and Nevada), with Nevada and
New Mexico battleground states. In the four blue states, none of the state laws have been
reinstated through legislative action, despite the fact that the injunctions were issued some time
ago. Indeed, California voters rejected a parental notification proposition and New Hampshire
repealed its parental notification law after the Supreme Court decision in Ayotte. See note __
supra; see also Planned Parenthood of Cent. N.J. v. Farmer, 762 A.2d 620 (N.J. 2000) (finding
the law violated the state's constitution, no further action taken); Zbaraz v. Ryan, No. 84 C 771
(N.D. Ill. Feb. 8, 1996) (finding state notification statute unconstitutional because of lack of
judicial bypass procedure). In the five red states, three states (including the battleground states
of Nevada and New Mexico and mountain west Montana) have taken no further action; Alaska
moved promptly to reinstate the law and Idaho is appealing the injunction. See Wicklund v.
State, No. ADV-97-671 (Mont. Dist. Ct. Feb. 12, 1999) appeal dismissed (Mont. Nov. 29, 1999)
(law is unconstitutional and unenforceable because it violates the equal protection clause of the
Montana Constitution by infringing, without adequate justification, the privacy rights of
pregnant young women who wish to terminate their pregnancies); see also N.M. Op. Att'y Gen.
No. 90-19 (Oct. 3, 1990) (finding notification statute unconstitutional in 1990, no further action
taken); Glick v. McKay, 937 F.2d 434 (9th Cir. 1991) (preliminary injunction upheld), No. CV182
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Taking these developments together, the blue states as a whole look
different from the red states. Of the nineteen states that voted for Kerry in 2004,
almost a third (six) have no parental involvement statutes.186 A seventh, New
Hampshire, repealed its law, the only state to do so. Three have had their state
statutes declared unconstitutional, and declined to enact alternative measures
(with California having defeated propositions that would do so two years in a
row), for a total of ten with no enforcement whatsoever.187 Four additional
states have softened the impact of their parental involvement statutes through
physician waivers or an expansion of the adults who can act in place of
parents.188 This leaves five of the nineteen states with relatively strict laws
intact: Massachusetts,189 Minnesota,190 Rhode Island,191 Pennsylvania,192 and
Michigan.193 None of these more restrictive statutes, however, has been enacted
since 2000.
All of the thirty-one red states, in contrast, have enacted parental
notification statutes Twenty-five of these states have strict parental notification
N-85-331-ECR (D. Nev. Oct. 10, 1991) (permanent injunction issued); Planned Parenthood v.
State, 3AN-97-6014 CI (Alaska Super. Ct. Oct. 13, 2003). That decision is currently being
appealed by the state to the Alaska Supreme Court. Planned Parenthood v. State, S-11365
(Alaska Feb. 17, 2004) (appeal filed). In March 2007, Idaho enacted a new parental consent law
to replace previous versions of the statute which the courts had held were unconstitutional and
unenforceable. Planned Parenthood of Idaho, Inc. v. Wasden, 376 F.3d 908, 926 (9th Cir.
2004), cert. denied, No. 04-703 (Mar. 28, 2005) (unconstitutional and unenforceable because the
statute contained an inadequate medical emergency exception to protect a young woman's
health). In Florida, by contrast, following a decision that an earlier parental notification statute
was unconstitutional in N. Fla. Women's Health & Counseling Serv. v. State, 866 So. 2d (Fla.
2003), the state amended its constitution to reinstate such a requirement. FLA. STAT. ANN. §
390.01114 (West 2006) (enacted following a constitutional amendment by referendum that
would permit parental notification without violating the minor's state constitutional right of
privacy, as long as the parental notification contained certain exceptions and a judicial bypass.).
186
These states are Connecticut, Hawaii, New York, Oregon, Vermont, and Washington.
187
California rejected such a proposition at the polls, Illinois has yet to adopt a judicial bypass
process a decade after the original ruling and New Jersey has taken no action after seven years.
188
The four states are Maine, Delaware, Maryland and Wisconsin. Delaware, however, only
requires parental involvement for teens under 16. Planned Parenthood, Parental Notication
Laws, supra note __. Carol Sanger emphasizes that the contrast between nuanced consent laws
for medical care, including contraceptive use, and the blanket consent or notification
requirements for abortion underscores the politicized nature of these enactments. Sanger,
Regulating Teenage Abortion, supra note __, at 307 (“The sweep of coverage suggests from the
start that parental involvement statutes focus not on adolescence as a stage of development but
rather on minority as a site of control.”)
189
The Massachusetts law, which originally required the consent of both parents, was limited to
one parent and upheld in Planned Parenthood League of Massachusetts, Inc. v. Attorney
General, 677 N.E.2d 101 (Mass. 1997).
190
Minnesota’s restrictive law was upheld in Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417 (1990).
191
See R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 23- 4.7-6 (enacted 1982)
192
The state’s parental consent law was upheld in Planned Parenthood of SE Pa. v. Casey, 505
U.S. 833 (1992).
193
Michigan’s parental consent law was upheld in Planned Parenthood of Mid-Michigan, Inc. v.
Attorney General, No. D 91-0571 AZ (Mich. Cir. Ct. Apr. 29, 1994).
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or consent statutes, while six have less stringent laws.194 Moreover, two red
states, Mississippi195 and North Dakota,196 mandate that both parents consent.197
Oklahoma, Texas, Utah, and Wyoming require both parental consent and
notification.198
Parental notification statutes—and the fight to enact or repeal them—
reinforce the distinctions between the two family systems described above.
Carol Sanger suggests that “parental involvement statutes, while often couched
in the language of family togetherness and child protection, are less concerned
with developing sound or nuanced family policies in the area of adolescent
reproduction than with securing a set of political goals aimed at thwarting access
to abortion, restoring parental authority, and punishing girls for having sex.”199
Empirical research, while imperfect, concurs that parental involvement laws are
more important in discouraging abortion than in promoting individual teen
health or family communications.200 We believe parental notification laws are
different because they address the linchpin of the two family systems we have
described. The blue state system rests on sexual autonomy and delayed
childbearing. While delayed adulthood might suggest less room for adolescent
decision-making, few things would more quickly derail blue state adolescence
than an improvident birth. Accordingly, acknowledging teen immaturity makes
the abortion that much more important to secure.201
The red state system places more of a premium in channeling teens from
childhood into adulthood without a period of independence.202 Autonomy is
less important even in adulthood, and authority is more critical. George Lakoff,
194

In three red states – Montana, New Mexico, and Nevada - the laws have been enjoined and
no further action has been taken. Two more, West Virginia and Ohio, permit waivers or the
expansion of the adults who can act in lieu of parents. An additional state lowers the age of
mandatory parental involvement to teens younger than 17 and permits grandparents acting in
loco parentis to take the place of the parents S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 44-41-10(m), (n) (original
statute enacted 1990), -30 (enacted 1990), -31 to -37 (enacted 1990).
195
See Barnes v. Mississippi, 992 F.2d 1335 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 976 (1993); ProChoice Miss. v. Fordice, 716 So. 2d 645 (Miss. 1998).
196
N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 14-02.1-03.1 (enacted 1981), 14-02.1-03 (enacted 1975), 14-02.1-02
(Enacted 1975; Last Amended 1995), 14-02.1-02.1 (Enacted 1991).
197
GUTTMACHER INSTITUTE, PARENTAL INVOLVEMENT IN MINORS’ ABORTIONS, STATE POL’Y IN
BRIEF (2007), http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib_PIMA.pdf.
198
Planned Parenthood, Parental Notification Laws, supra note __.
199
Sanger, Regulating Teenage Abortion, supra note __, at 307.
200
See Naomi Cahn and June Carbone, Empirical Research on Parental Involvement Laws
(unpublished manuscript on file with authors, 2007).
201
Of course, for those who object to abortion per se on moral grounds, the practical
consequences are irrelevant; nonetheless, parental notification assumes the availability of
abortion as a permissible choice. The major effects of the parental notification laws has been to
delay the abortion, with health consequences for teens. See Guttmacher, Parental Involvement,
supra note __.
202
Indeed, given the absence of full cognitive maturity throughout the teen years, any system
that provides for the assumption of adult responsibilities before that age is likely to do so in the
context of social channeling rather than independent action.

37

RED FAMILIES V. BLUE FAMILIES
in his study of differences in American cultural styles, emphasizes the
distinction what he terms “the strict father” and “the nurturing mother” in styles
of communication.203 Parental notification statutes reaffirm the primacy of
parental authority,204 with, as Sanger suggests, a subtext of punishment for sex
within a cultural context that also places more emphasis on punishment and
redemption.205 The result is to reinforce different family formation strategies in
the two systems.
B. Same-Sex Marriage
Same-sex marriage and, indeed, recognition of same-sex relationships
more generally inspired Justice Scalia’s reference to a “culture war,” and few
issues are more polarizing.206 Nonetheless, recognition of same-sex
relationships, like parental involvement laws, is an evolving process.207
Relatively liberal states, like California, voted overwhelmingly for a proposition
defining marriage as a relationship between a man and a woman in 2000, and
then a short time later elected a Democratic legislature that adopted a broad
domestic partnership statute without much fanfare.208 The intensity of the issue
in recent years has been tied in part to a Republican political strategy of placing
anti-same-sex marriage initiatives on the ballot as a way of increasing the
fundamentalist turnout.209 That strategy may have helped seal the outcome of
203

GEORGE LAKOFF, DON’T THINK OF AN ELEPHANT: KNOW YOUR VALUES AND FRAME THE
DEBATE (2004); MORAL POLITICS: HOW LIBERALS AND CONSERVATIVES THINK (2002)
[hereinafter MORAL POLITICS].
204
Lakoff emphasizes that within a strict father universe, children are “born bad” and learn
through punishment. Interview by Bonnie Powell with George Lakoff (2003),
http://www.berkeley.edu/news/media/releases/2003/10/27_lakoff.shtml; see also Martin
Guggenheim, Minor Rights: The Adolescent Abortion Cases 30 HOFSTRA L. REV. 589, 639
(2002)(“The abortion cases are simply a use of state power to reorder society, shifting power
over children from parents to judges when it serves an instrumental value wholly apart from a
child's rights. . . . For those minors who, for whatever reason, choose not to seek parental
consent, a new adult was vested with the power over them.”).
205
Of course, Lakoff further observes that within such a system, abortion may not be
appropriate at all. “According to Strict Father morality, an unmarried teenage girl should not be
having teenage sex at all. . . . She has to be responsible for the consequence of her actions if she
is to learn from her mistakes. An abortion would simply sanction her immoral behavior.”
MORAL POLITICS, supra note ___, at 267-68. If abortion is not appropriate, however, it is also
less of a concern that parental notification statutes may delay or frustrate the procedure.
206
See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
207
See, e.g., http://www.religioustolerance.org/hom_poll2.htm (discussing poll that asked, "Do
you think homosexual relations between consenting adults should or should not be legal?”,
and documenting the increase in the percent saying these relations should be legal from 43% in
June 1977 to 60% in June 2003)
208
http://www.religioustolerance.org/hom_marl3.htm. It received 61.4% of the vote.
RELIGIOUS TOLERANCE.ORG. TWO CALIFORNIA LAWS REGARDING SEXUAL MINORITIES.
209
See, e.g., RED AND BLUE NATION? CHARACTERISTICS AND CAUSES OF AMERICA’S
POLARIZED POLITICS (Pietro S. Nivola and David W. Brady eds., 2006) (evaluating claims of
polarization, and distinguishing between polarized parties and public attitudes);
Wayne Baker, Purple America (2005)
http://webuser.bus.umich.edu/wayneb/Purple%20America%20June%202005.pdf (emphasizing
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the 2004 election, and increased the visibility of same-sex issues within the
political system.210
National politics aside, however, divisions on same-sex marriage also
involve central parts of the two family systems we have charted above. The first
is the difference between marriage as an institution designed to facilitate
commitment and companionship versus marriage as an institution uniquely
designed to promote the unity of sex, procreation and childrearing.211 The
Religious Coalition for Marriage argues, for example, that marriage provides the
optimal setting for childrearing, as children do best with a mother and a father.
Consequently, “when marriage is entered into and gotten out of lightly, when it
is no longer the boundary of sexual activity, or when it is allowed to be radically
redefined, a host of personal and civic ills can be expected to follow.”212

that there is greater polarization among the political parties and political activists than among the
public as a whole.);
210
Debra Rosenberg and Karen Breslau, Culture Wars: Winning the “Values” Vote, NEWSWEEK
CAMPAIGN 2004, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/6401635/site/newsweek/. But see Gregory B.
Lewis, Same-Sex Marriage and the 2004 Presidential Election, 38 POL. SCI. & POLITICS. page,
195-9 (2005) (suggesting other issues may have been more critical to the outcome). See also
Post and Siegel, supra note 25, at 56, n.232 (emphasizing that conservative groups see abortion
and same-sex marriage as essentially the same issue).
211
For articulation of these two positions, see Douglas W. Allen, An Economic Assessment of
Same-Sex Marriage Laws, 29 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL. 949, 951-954 (2006). (draft at 8); see
also PEW RESEARCH CENTER, AS MARRIAGE AND PARENTHOOD DRIFT APART, PUBLIC IS
CONCERNED ABOUT SOCIAL IMPACT 27 (2007),
http://pewresearch.org/assets/social/pdf/Marriage.pdf (finding that only 41% of Americans find
children important to making a marriage worked in 2007 compared to 55% in 1993. By
contrast, sharing household chores and having a happy sexual relationship have become more
important, with 62 and 70%, respectively, citing those factors as important to a successful
marriage). When asked “which is closer to your views about the main purpose of marriage?
Forming a lifetime union between two adults for mutual happiness and fulfillment or for bearing
and raising children,” 65% chose mutual happiness and fulfillment, 23% chose bearing and
raising children, and 7% said both. Id. at 29.
212
RELIGIOUS COALITION FOR MARRIAGE, A LETTER FROM AMERICA’S RELIGIOUS LEADERS
IN D EFENSE OF MARRIAGE (2006), http://www.nhclc.org/about/pdf/defenseofmarriage.doc. See
also Maggie Gallagher, (How) Will Gay Marriage Weaken Marriage as a Social Institution: A
Reply to Andrew Koppelman, 2 U. ST. THOMAS L. REV. 33 (2005). She does not want to be
misunderstood as saying that:
“marriage is in order to produce children.” Marriage is not a factory for childbearing. . . .
Marriage as a universal social institution is grounded In certain universal features of human
nature. When men and women have sex, they make babies . . .
. . . Marriage intrinsically aims at an enduring, exclusive, sexual union between a man and a
woman, because managing the procreative consequences of human sexual attraction is at
the core of its reason for existence.
Id. at 44, 46.
For articulation of the religious position in favor of recognition of same-sex marriage, see David
Myers and Letha Scanzoni, WHAT GOD HAS JOINED TOGETHER: A CHRISTIAN CASE FOR GAY
MARRIAGE (2005). Letha Scanzoni is active in the Evangelical and Ecumenical Women’s
Caucus. http://www.eewc.com/Update/Fall2003Contemporaneity.htm
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Closely related to the role of marriage as maximizing child development
is its role as a “boundary of sexual activity.” Accordingly, the Religious
Coalition for Marriage finds gay marriage particularly threatening to the
concept of faithfulness in marriage because gay men are less likely to value
sexual fidelity than are lesbians or married people.213 Indeed, while Americans
generally support the ideal of marital fidelity, they differ in the importance they
attach to regulation of sexuality in other contexts – and in the importance of
channeling sexual activity into marriage.214
Differences in worldview exacerbate differences in the understanding of
the marital ideal. Poll data indicates for example that 55% of Americans believe
that homosexuality is a “sin,” and that these views are more strongly held by
evangelicals (76%).215 Moreover, while the country is evenly divided on
whether homosexuality can be changed, evangelicals and those with
conservative political beliefs are substantially more likely to find that
homosexuality is a matter of lifestyle choice.216 Indeed, negative attitudes
213

RELIGIOUS COALITION FOR MARRIAGE, TOP 10 SOCIAL SCIENTIFIC ARGUMENTS AGAINST
SAME SEX MARRIAGE (2006); see also Ariela R. Dubler, Immoral Purposes: Marriage and the
Genus of Illicit Sex, 115 YALE L.J. 756, 812 (2006) (“Marriage is at once powerful to confer
legal privileges and to shield people from the dangers of sexual illicitness, and powerless to
protect itself from the taint of those very illicit practices.”). On the other hand, several studies
refute the idea that gay men are much more promiscuous than heterosexual men. Rauch, supra
not __ , at 143; DALE CARPENTER, THE MYTH OF GAY PROMISCUITY (2003),
http://www.marriagedebate.com/2003/08/myth-of-gay-promiscuity-dale-carpenter.htm. Based
on his research, Eugene Volokh noted on his blog: “gay and bisexual males (defined as having
had at least one same-sex relationship in the last 5 years) have an average (not a median) of
26.6+/-11.5 lifetime sexual partners compared to an average of 16.9+/-3 for straights. . . the
GSS dataset . . . reports that the median for gay and bisexual men is about 10, compared to a
median for straight men of about 6.” The Volokh Conspiracy,
http://volokh.com/2003_05_18_volokh_archive.html#200329250.
214
Linguist George Lakoff observes:
[T]ake gay marriage, which the right has made a rallying topic. Surveys have been done that say
Americans are overwhelmingly against gay marriage. Well, the same surveys show that they
also overwhelmingly object to discrimination against gays. These seem to be opposite facts, but
they're not. "Marriage" is about sex. When you say "gay marriage," it becomes about gay sex,
and approving of gay marriage becomes implicitly about approving of gay sex..
Bonnie Azab Powell, Framing the Issues: UC Berkeley Professor George Lakoff Tells How
Conservatives Use Language to Dominate Politics, UCBerkeleyNews, Oct. 27, 2003,
http://www.berkeley.edu/news/media/releases/2003/10/27_lakoff.shtml. The Pew Research
Center, for example, while it found that the public continues to emphasize fidelity in marriage
(93% rate it as important to a successful marriage), also found that 59% believe that a couples
having sexual relations before marrying is either either not wrong at all or only sometimes
wrong. Pew Research Center, supra note __, at 3.
215
THE PEW FORUM ON RELIGION AND PUBLIC LIFE, RELIGIOUS BELIEFS UNDERPIN
OPPOSITION TO HOMOSEXUALITY (2003), http://pewforum.org/docs/index.php?DocID=37.
216
Id. Twice as many liberals as conservatives say that people are born homosexual. In addition,
“73% of committed white evangelicals think homosexuals can change their sexual orientation;
61% of black Protestants agree. By comparison, 54% of white Catholics and half of white
mainline Protestants think homosexuals cannot change their orientation, a view shared by twothirds (66%) of seculars.” Id. See also Nancy J. Knauer, Homosexuality as Contagion: From
the Well of Loneliness to the Boy Scouts, 29 HOFSTRA L. REV. 401 (2000).
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toward homosexuality tend to correspond with red/blue divisions more
generally. The most negative attitudes toward gays and lesbians, for example,
are held in the South, the least negative in the East, more negative in rural than
urban areas, by those with more conservative political beliefs, and by the least
educated.217 A major study further found “homosexuality in general not merely
the contentious issue of gay marriage is a major topic in churches and other
houses of worship. In fact, clergy are nearly as likely to address homosexuality
from the pulpit as they are to speak out about abortion or prayer in school.”218
In what we term blue state family values, in contrast, greater emphasis is
placed on equality, empathy and tolerance.219 As a matter of secular reason,
“sin” disappears from the lexicon, and increasing majorities in the country as a
whole disapprove of the criminalization of consenting sexual activity between
adults.220 Marriage is no longer associated with hierarchal authority or the
gendered assignment of family roles,221 and instead becomes a matter of choice
designed to express love and commitment. 222 Within this tradition, recognition
217

PEW FORUM, supra note 193.
Id. “The clergy in evangelical churches focus considerably more attention on homosexuality
and address it far more negatively than do ministers and priests in other denominations. Twothirds of evangelical Protestants who attend church services at least once a month say their
ministers speak out on homosexual issues, compared with only about half of Catholics (49%)
and just a third of mainline Protestants (33%). And compared with others who attend services
where homosexuality is discussed, substantially more evangelicals (86%) say the message they
are receiving is that homosexuality should be discouraged, not accepted.”
219
See, e.g., Naomi R. Cahn, The Moral Complexities of Family Law, 50 STAN. L. REV. 225,
270-71 (1997) (noting a shift in moral values, placing greater emphasis on gender equity as a
“primary objective,” and individual rights “within the contexts of community, equality, and
commitment.”);.Vivian Hamilton, Principles of U.S. Family Law, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 31
(2006).
220
Religious tolerance, supra. See also AEI Studies in Public Opinion, Attitudes About
Homosexuality and Gay Marriage (2004),
http://www.aei.org/docLib/20050121_HOMOSEXUALITY.pdf (summarizing poll results that
find between 57% and 74% disapprove of criminal sanctions against homosexuality depending
on the polls same and wording).
221
But see MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY
AND OTHER TWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES (1995); N ANCY D. P OLIKOFF , BEYOND
(STRAIGHT AND GAY) MARRIAGE: VALUING ALL FAMILIES UNDER THE LAW (forthcoming
2008) (manuscript on file with authors); KATHERINE FRANKE, EMANCIPATION
APPROXIMATION (forthcoming)(manuscript on file with authors).
222
See, e.g., JONATHAN RAUCH, GAY MARRIAGE: W HY IT IS GOOD FOR GAYS, GOOD FOR
STRAIGHTS, AND GOOD FOR AMERICAN 6 (2004). Similarly, the Pew Research Center study
found that the overwhelming majority of Americans choose companionship over procreation as
the principal purpose of marriage. Pew Research Center, supra note __. The study did not
provide a regional breakdown, but it did find Latinos more likely than whites to rank children
more highly as a purpose of marriage. 69% ranked children “very important” to a successful
marriage compared to 35% of whites and 49% of blacks. Nonetheless, even Latinos chose
companionship over children as the “main purpose” of marriage, albeit by smaller margins (51
to 38% as opposed to 67 to 21% for whites, and 63 to 23% for blacks. Id. at 8. Regular church
goers chose companionship over raising children by 58 to 25% while those attending less
regularly or not at all chose companionship over children by 74 to 18%. Id. at 7.
218
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of same-sex relationships becomes a matter of basic equality,223 and inclusion of
gay and lesbian relationships within marriage a symbol of the institution’s
transformation from its more patriarchal past.224 The cultural meaning of samesex marriage within the well-educated, secular, urban coasts differs dramatically
from its context within the still closeted, more rural, evangelical Midwest and
South.225
We also suspect that age of family formation intersects with tolerance
toward homosexuality to reinforce these differences. As the movie “Brokeback
Mountain” illustrates, youthful marriages often occur before young adults have
fully worked through their own sexuality. As a result, family members may
first become aware of homosexual behavior in the context of divorce. In areas
of the country that are more supportive of gay and lesbian relationships, or
among groups that marry later, sexual orientation and identity is more likely to
be firmly established before entry into a long- term relationship.226 Same-sex
relationships in these regions are thus coded as part of a fight for recognition
rather than an association with infidelity and family crisis.227
223

The state judicial decisions that have required recognition of same-sex marriage, civil unions,
or domestic partnerships have all turned on equal rights analysis. See Goodridge v. Mass.
Department of Public Health, 798 N.E. 2d 941 (2003); Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196 (N.J.
2006); Baker v. Vermont, 744 A.2d 864, 886 (Vt. 1999). In Washington, while the court
declined to find that the state constitution mandated recognition of same-sex marriage, also used
an equal rights framework for analysis, though it emphasized judicial restraint and the failure to
establish a suspect class. Andersen v. King County, 138 P.3d 963 (Wash. 2006) (en banc). In
contrast, the New York decision in Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1 (N.Y. 2006), based its
analysis rejecting recognition of same-sex marriage on the distinctive relationship between
marriage and procreation.
224
Indeed, marriage reassumes its traditional role in channeling sexual expression and
restraining promiscuity. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., THE CASE FOR SAME-SEX
MARRIAGE: FROM SEXUAL LIBERTY TO CIVILIZED COMMITMENT 8-9 (1996); see generally,
WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE AND DARREN R. SPEDALE, GAY MARRIAGE: FOR BETTER OR FOR
WORSE?: WHAT WE’VE LEARNED FROM THE EVIDENCE (2006).
225
We acknowledge that substantial hostility toward gays and lesbians and toward same-sex
marriage exists in blue-states as well. Nonetheless, polls show greater movement of attitudes in
those states. In addition, there is a substantial difference between Catholics, who often dominate
in the Northeast and upper and industrial Midwest on these issues, and evangelical Protestants.
Catholics are much more likely to view homosexuality as something that can’t be changed and
Catholic clergy, who are more likely than Protestant clergy to emphasize abortion, are less likely
to discuss homosexuality. The Pew Forum, supra note 193.
226
See, e.g., TAN (cases discussed in the next section). Family law cases addressing
homosexuality have overwhelmingly involved disputes between divorcing couples where samesex attraction was a factor in custody and visitation determinations. Today, a larger number of
cases, particularly in blue states, involve the separation of same-sex partners. See, e.g.,
Chambers v. Ormiston, Case No. 06-340-M.P., pending before the Rhode Island Supreme Court
(one of the authors of this article is a signatory to an amicus brief in this case which involves
whether a Rhode Island court can dissolve a Massachusetts same-sex marriage). See
http://www.glad.org/GLAD_Cases/Amici/Chambers_Ormiston/GLAD.pdf.
227
See infra TAN (discussing the change over time from cases that focused on custody and
visitation in divorce actions involving one parent’s acknowledgment of a same-sex relationship
to cases focusing on recognition of same-sex partners who have jointly parented a child).
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Given these differences, it would be remarkable if same-sex marriage
were not a politically contentious issue, even within blue states.228 These states
differ most from red states in the degree of change in attitudes over the last three
decades. In the period from 1973 to 2002, the percentage of the country as a
whole responding yes to the question “Are homosexual relations always
wrong?” dropped 18% points. The groups dropping most dramatically were
younger (especially those 30 to 44), Democrats and Independents rather than
Republicans (who dropped by only 9 points), those attending church once a
month as opposed to both the more and less religious,229 and those in the
Northeast (23%) as opposed to the South (13%).230
Recognition of same-sex relationships follows greater tolerance toward
homosexuality more generally. One state, the bluest of blue states, recognizes
same-sex marriage.231 Five states – all blue – recognize civil unions or domestic
partnerships that are the equivalent of marriage.232 Three states and the District
of Columbia – all blue – provide some statewide rights to same-sex couples
falling short of marriage.233 Altogether, nine of the nineteen blue states – and
none of the red states -- extend at least some legislative recognition to same-sex
couples.
At the other end of the spectrum, thirty-three states now have statutory
bans on marriage for same-sex couples – overwhelmingly as a result of
propositions place on the ballot between 2004 and 2006.234 Three (Alaska,
228

Although the number of people who “strongly oppose” gay marriage in March 2006 – 28% -has decreased from its high of 42% in February 2004, and although the overwhelming majority
of Americans support equality for gays and lesbians, a majority remains against gay marriage
nationally. See William Saletan, Gay-Marriage Proposal, WASH. POST, April 30, 2006, at B2.
Nonetheless, the most recent polls see the public split almost 50-50 on the issue of Civil Unions,
down from the majority that had supported them earlier. PEW RESEARCH CENTER, supra note
__, at 48.
229
Those attending church once a month dropped from 72% to 46%, compared with those
attending once a week who dropped from 84% to 79% and those attending once a year or less,
who dropped from 63% to 46%. AEI, supra note __.
230
Id. The Northeast fell from 64 to 41%; the South from 84 to 71%.
231
See Goodridge v. Mass. Department of Public Health, 798 N.E. 2d 941 (Mass. 2003); Mass.
Gen. Laws ch. 207 (2007)
232
Vermont (civil unions, 2001);Connecticut (civil unions, 2005);California (domestic
partnerships, last amended in 2006); New Hampshire (civil unions, effective January 2008);New
Jersey (civil unions, 2007); Oregon (domestic partnerships, effective January 2008). HUMAN
RIGHTS CAMPAIGN, Relationship Recognition in the U.S.,
http://www.hrc.org/Template.cfm?Section=Your_Community&Template=/ContentManagement
/ContentDisplay.cfm&ContentID=16305 (updated May 31, 2007)
233
Id. Hawaii (reciprocal beneficiaries, 1997); Maine (domestic partnerships, 2004);
Washington State (domestic partnerships, July 2007); District of Columbia (domestic
partnerships, implemented in 2002). See also Leslie Harris, Same-Sex Unions Around the
World: Marriage, Civil Unions, Registered Partnerships—What are the Differences and Why
do the Matter?, 19 PROBATE & PROPERTY 31, 33 (Sept/Oct 2005)
234
http://www.thetaskforce.org/downloads/marriagemap.pdf.

43

RED FAMILIES V. BLUE FAMILIES
Nebraska, and Nevada) had constitutional provisions limiting marriage to a
relationship between a man and a woman before 2004.235 Two (Louisiana and
Missouri) adopted such an amendment in early 2004.236 Eleven more states
adopted such amendments on November 2, 2004: Arkansas, Georgia, Kentucky,
Michigan, Mississippi, Montana, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, and
Utah.237 Kansas and Texas added such amendments in 2005.238 Alabama did so
in early 2006. Colorado, Idaho, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee,
Virginia, and Wisconsin passed additional amendments banning same-sex
marriage in November, 2006, with voters in Arizona rejecting such a proposal in
their state.239 Moreover, the amendments in Alabama, Arkansas, Georgia,
Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Nebraska, North Dakota, Idaho, Oklahoma,
Ohio, South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, Virginia, Wisconsin, and Utah also
have language that may limit civil unions or domestic partnerships.240 Twentyfour of the twenty-six states with such amendments are red, and six of the seven
remaining red states (as well as twelve of the blue states) have statutes limiting
marriage to a relationship between a man and a woman.241
The only red state not to ban same-sex marriage through either a
constitutional amendment or legislation is New Mexico; its legislature has
repeatedly refused to enact such provisions.242 Of the blue states, only Rhode
235

The Alaska Constituion states: "To be valid or recognized in this state, a marriage may exist
only between one man and one woman." ALASKA CONST. art. 1, § 25; the Nebraska Constitution
provides: "Only marriage between a man and a woman shall be valid or recognized in Nebraska.
The uniting of two persons of the same-sex in a civil union, domestic partnership, or other
similar same-sex relationship shall not be valid or recognized in Nebraska." NEB. CONST. art. 1,
§ 29; and in Nevada, the constitution states: "Only a marriage between a male and female shall
be recognized and given effect in this state." NEV. CONST. art. 1, § 21
236
Julie L. Davies, Family Law Chapter: Sate Regulation of Same-Sex Marriage, 7 GEO. J.
GENDER & L. 1079, 1086 (2006).
237
Id. at 1087.
238
Id.
239
Stateline.org, Tetons Handily Press Gay Marriage Ban (Nov. 7, 2005)
240
State Prohibitions on Marriage for Same-Sex Couples, HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN, Nov.
2006,
http://www.hrc.org/Template.cfm?Section=Home&CONTENTID=28225&TEMPLATE=/Conte
ntManagement/ContentDisplay.cfm. These provisions vary, but they are potentially more
immediate in their impact. While few of the states banning same-sex marriage were likely to
recognize such marriages even without the amendments, a number of states might have provided
other recognition to same-sex couples. The Ohio Supreme Court recently resolved a dispute
between lower state courts as to whether a domestic violence criminal conviction violates the
Ohio Defense of Marriage Act to the extent it criminalizes abuse committed against a nonmarital
(same-sex or heterosexual) partner. State v. Carswell, 2007 Ohio LEXIS 1654 (July 25, 2007).
241
HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN, STATE RECOGNITION. A number of the blue states, however,
including California, Connecticut, Oregon, Hawaii, Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont and
Washington, provide recognition to domestic partnerships, civil unions or reciprocal
beneficiaries. None of the red states do.
242
Religious Tolerance, supra, http://www.religioustolerance.org/hom_marrnm.htm. Studies of
attitudes toward homosexuality generally indicate that Hispanics are more tolerant than whites
or blacks, id. at 4, and that Catholics are more tolerant than Protestants. Id. at 5. In contrast,
Catholic priests place greater emphasis in the pulpit on abortion than do Protestant ministers. Id.
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Island has neither banned same-sex marriage nor adopted some recognition for
same couples. The other states, however, without effective statutory
prohibitions are blue: Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, Connecticut,
Rhode Island, and Vermont.243
C. Non-marital Cohabitation in Custody Cases
If same-sex marriage and anything connected to abortion are among the
most polarizing family law issues of the day, what about the more prosaic issues
of family law decision-making? Do red-blue distinction matter only when the
press and politicians are involved? To assess that question, we also examine a
quieter issue, albeit one likely to affect a potentially larger number of litigants:
viz., the role of non-marital cohabitation in custody decision-making. A
comparison of judicial decisions to legislative action indicates that regional
differences still exist, but that they play out in contexts with the potential to
diffuse rather than inflame conflicts between warring paradigms. Considering
the difference between legislative and judicial decision-making is critical to
assessing the future of family law federalism.
In the context of a family system that has largely deregulated adult
relationships, child custody decisions at divorce have become “ground zero in
the gender wars.”244 That is, while divorces granted on no fault grounds do not
necessarily pass judgment about the circumstances that produced the split,245
custody decisions, which evaluate the quality of parenting, often rest, implicitly
or explicitly, on moral views of parenting behavior.246 For family systems that
continue to celebrate marriage, and to draw clear lines between marital and nonmarital sexuality, cohabitation with an unmarried partner should be a matter
relevant to the child’s interests. At the same time, in those states that deregulate
consensual adult behavior, non-marital cohabitation, with a same-sex or
different sex partner, should not be a matter of concern. We would ordinarily
expect therefore red states and blue states to differ in their approach to custody.
They do, but not as starkly as the battles over legislative issues might suggest.
We start with a brief description of the evolution of the law in this area.
At one time, most states considered the morality of the parents’ conduct in
243

HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN, RELATIONSHIP RECOGNITION IN THE U.S., supra note __, Maine’s
legislation, which is the most limited, allows both same-sex and opposite sex couples to register
for domestic partnership, a status which grants various rights in protective proceeding and
intestacy; California, Connecticut, and Vermont offer couples almost all of the rights associated
with marriage (Vermont and Connecticut’s legislation are limited to same-sex partners); New
Jersey and Hawaii offer somewhat less expansive rights. Id.
244
See generally CARBONE, supra note __.
245
States vary considerably, however, as to whether they allow fault to be considered for some
purposes in the financial allocations at divorce. See Ira Mark Ellman, The Place of Fault in a
Modern Divorce Law, 28 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 773 (1996) ( summarizing and cataloguing the different
state approaches).
246
Id.
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awarding custody, and viewed non-marital cohabitation, with a different sex and
particularly a same-sex partner, to be a relevant if not automatically
disqualifying factor.247 Today, most courts require proof of actual harm or
detriment to the child arising from the relationship before it can be a basis for
restricting visitation or changing custody.248 Moreover, while some courts
continue to presume harm from a non-marital partner’s presence in the home or
the parent’s bedroom while the child is present,249 most require a more direct
showing of adverse effect on the child before they restrict parental contact – at
least in the context of heterosexual relationships.250
The courts are more divided on the issue of homosexual conduct. While
the courts have overwhelmingly held that sexual orientation per se should not be
a basis for denying parental contact with the child,251 many continue to
condition custody or visitation on the absence of overnight visitors or explicit
displays of affection or to consider it in the award of custody.252 To assess the
regional distribution of these decisions, we go back to our list of the states with
the lowest (Utah, Oklahoma, Idaho, Arkansas, and Kentucky – all red) and
highest (Massachusetts, New York, Rhode Island, Connecticut, and New Jersey
– all blue) median age of first marriage, and describe the progression of the
reported opinions on the issue in each state.
We find, unsurprisingly, that the red and blue states approach the issue
247

See, e.g., Jarrett v. Jarrett, 400 N. E. 2d 421 (Ill. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 927; Dockins
v. Dockins, 475 So. 2d 571 (Ala. Civ. App. 1985) (mother denied custody; entertained paramour
in home when children were present).
248
Dunn v. Dunn, 609 So. 2d 1277 (Miss. 1992)(error for the chancellor to prohibit the presence
of the father's lover during visitation with his children, because there was no evidence of any
detriment to the children and harm could not be presumed from lover’s presence alone);
Buschardt v. Jones, 998 S.W.2d 791 (Mo. Ct. App. W.D. 1999), reh'g and/or transfer denied,
(June 1, 1999) and transfer denied, (June 29, 1999)(moral misconduct insufficient to deprive a
parent of the right to continuing contact with the child); Rushing v. Rushing, 724 So. 2d 911;
(Miss. 1998)(error to restrict mother’s visitation to absence of male visitors without showing of
detriment to the child); In re Marriage of Pleasant, 256 Ill. App. 3d 742, 628 N.E.2d 633, 195
Ill. Dec. 169 (1993)(parent's open involvement in lesbian relationship not grounds to restrict
visitation in the absence of evidence of inappropriate behavior in child's presence).
249
See, e.g., Lasseigne v. Lasseigne, 434 So. 2d 1240 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1983)(restricting
father’s visitation on the grounds that having children exposed to his relationship with “his
concubine” would undermine respect for the family as an institution).
250
See, e.g., Dunn, supra note __; Robin Cheryl Miller, Restrictions on Parent's Child Visitation
Rights Based on Parent's Sexual Conduct, 99 A.L.R.5th 475 (2002) (citing only four states -Florida, Louisiana, Vermont, and Virginia -- that do so). Virginia has recently reaffirmed this
practice. See Carrico v. Blevins, 402 S.E. 2d 235, 237 (Va. 1991)(upholding the restriction
that the child could not be kept overnight where the mother and her lover lived together);
A.O.V. v. J.R.V., 2007 Va. App. LEXIS 64 (Feb. 27, 2007)(upholding restrictions on overnight
guests and displays of affection in front of the children.)
251
See, e.g., T.C.H. v. K.M.H., 784 S.W.2d 281 (Mo. App. 1989), In In re Marriage of Birdsall,
197 Cal. App. 3d 1024, 243 Cal. Rptr. 287 (Cal. App. 1988); Pryor v. Pryor, 714 N.E.2d 743
(Ind. App. 1999); Scott v. Scott, 665 So. 2d 760 (La. App. 1995).
252
See, e.g., A.O.V. v. J.R.V., 2007 Va. App. LEXIS 64 (Feb. 27, 2007) (upholding restrictions
on overnight guests and displays of affection in front of the children.)
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differently. The red states have been slower to move away from policing the
morality of the litigants before them, and they remain more likely to reaffirm
traditional moral values as part of their decisions. The blue states, in contrast,
have been much more eager to review lower court decisions to insure equality
and fairness for gay and lesbian parents. Nonetheless, both red and blue
decisions have evolved in a much less polarized fashion than the legislative
actions we have described in the context of same-sex marriage. That lesser
polarization has occurred in spite of another major difference between the red
and blue states we describe below: three of the five red states (Arkansas, Idaho
and Kentucky), but none of the blue states, have elected judges on the state’s
highest court.
The leading Utah Supreme Court case on the issues is Kallas v.
Kallas, decided in 1980. The father appealed the trial court’s grant of
overnight visitation to the mother on the ground of her lesbianism and former
drug use;254 the Supreme Court agreed, finding that:
253

such evidence bears clearly on the defendant’s ability to deal
appropriately with the three minor children . . . , the most appropriate
duration for any visits allowed, and, most importantly, the psychological
impact on the children resulting from more extended visits with a mother
who may, as a role model, at least to some extent cause serious conflict
in the minds of the children concerning certain basic life-styles.255
Citing cases from New York and New Jersey, the court suggested that
overnight visits might not be appropriate or that such visits might be conditioned
on a prohibition of non-marital cohabitation in the children’s presence.256
The Utah Supreme Court revisited the issue in 1994. In Tucker v.
Tucker, the intermediate appellate court had reversed a trial court decision to
transfer custody from the mother to the father, finding that the trial court failed
to link its findings of emotional instability and moral unfitness to the mother’s
parenting ability, and gave disproportionate weight to her lesbian relationships.
258
The Utah Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and reinstated the
257
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614 P.2d 641 (Utah 1980).
The trial court had excluded testimony on the subject because both factors had existed at the
time of the divorce (although the father did not know about them at the time).
255
Id. at 643.
256
Id. at 645. Two justices dissented, suggesting that the trial court was fully aware of the
sensitive nature of the evidence, and no abuse of discretion had occurred.
257
881 P.2d 948 (Utah app. 1994), rev’d 910 P. 2d 1209 (Utah 1996).
258
Id. at 1214. The trial court found that: “[Lynn] has chosen to act out her sexual preference by
conducting a relationship with a woman companion involving cohabitation without benefit of
marriage in the same home with the minor child. The court finds that this can be analyzed and
should be analyzed similarly to a situation involving cohabitation with a member of the opposite
sex without benefit of marriage in the presence of a minor child. The court finds that this
conduct on the part of [Lynn] during the pendency of this action and prior to the custody trial in
254
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trial court decision. It observed that:
The issue was not whether a trial court could properly question a parent's
morality where that parent merely cohabited with a member of the same
sex. Rather, the issue was whether a trial court could properly question
the morality of a parent who had cohabited with another person before
the divorce and while still married. The trial court found that the
occurrence of this conduct during the marriage and in the presence of the
child demonstrated Lynn's lack of moral example. It cannot be said that
the trial court abused its discretion in reaching this conclusion.259
While moving away from the visitation restrictions in Kallas designed to
shield children from their parent’s homosexuality, the Utah Supreme Court still
upheld the relevance of more nuanced moral determinations in a best interests
analysis.
The Oklahoma Supreme Court, with its appointed justices, considered
the issue in Fox v. Fox,260 decided about the same time as Tucker, and took a
very different approach. Four years later after the parties divorced, the father
petitioned for a change of custody on the ground that the mother was a lesbian.
The trial court granted the father’s motion. The Oklahoma Supreme Court
reversed, observing that: “the evidence in this case is not of sufficient quality to
prove the essential determinative factor -- a significant change of circumstance
that directly and adversely affects the children.”261
The standard the court adopted, which appears to have resolved the issue
in Oklahoma, is consistent with the majority approach in cases of heterosexual
cohabitation and, as developed below, most blue state rulings.
The Idaho Supreme Court, with elected justices, addressed the issue in
2004. In McGriff v. McGriff,262 the initial divorce decree provided for joint
physical and legal custody, with the two children spending roughly equal time
with each parent. After the mother discovered that the father was gay and that
his male companion had moved into the home, she sought a modification in the
custody decree. The magistrate agreed, granting the mother sole physical
this matter demonstrates a lack of moral example to the child and a lack of moral fitness. This
conduct is unlawful in the State of Utah.” Id. at 1213.
259
Id. at 1217-18. The case was followed in Thomas v. Thomas, 987 P.2d 603(1999). A fifteen
year marriage ended after the wife had an affair with her jui jitsu instructor, who was also
married. The trial court found that although the mother’s role as primary caretaker would have
ordinarily justified an award of custody to her, recent gun and domestic violence charges against
her lover and her continuing involvement with him justified the award to the father. The court
of appeal emphasized that this is not a case based solely on the fact of the non-marital affair or
the character of the parties, but a combination of factors related to the children’s best interests.
Id. at 608.
260
904 P.2d 66 (1995).
261
Id. at 70.
262
99 P.3d 111 (Idaho 2004).
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custody and providing the father visitation on the condition he not reside with
his male partner during their visits. The magistrate found, inter alia, that:
Father's decision to openly co-habit with [his partner] . . . is a change that will
generate questions from the girls and their friends regarding their Father's
lifestyle. Moreover, Father has minimized this issue in regard to the
conservative culture and morays (sic) in which the children live. Father has
shown some insensitivity to the girls' needs regarding his lifestyle, . . . expressly
contrary to the requests of and excluding the children's Mother.263
The father appealed, maintaining that the mother had difficulty accepting
his sexual orientation, and that her motion to change custody was entirely based
on his sexual orientation without a showing of detriment to the children. The
Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the trial court order. While it emphasized that a
change of custody could not be based on sexual orientation per se,264 it found
that magistrate had made specific findings on the effect on the children arising
from the growing hostility between the parents, the father’s partner’s actions
toward the Mother, and the Father’s refusal to respect the mother’s wishes for
joint communication with the children about the father’s homosexuality.265
The Arkansas Supreme Court, again with elected justices, walked a
different tightrope in Taylor v. Taylor, 266 decided during the same time period
as the Idaho case. In Taylor, the mother shared her home with an “admitted
lesbian,” who paid rent and sometimes slept in the mother’s bed.267 The
children occasionally joined them.268 The mother testified, however, that she
believed that homosexuality was wrong, and that she did not have a sexual
relationship with the woman.269 The trial court granted the father’s motion to
modify custody, observing that the mother’s decision simply to let a lesbian live
in her house with the children “even without sex is inappropriate behavior . . . .
It is at least poor parental judgment on the part of defendant to allow a well
known lesbian to both reside with defendant and the children and sleep in the
same bed with defendant.”270
The Arkansas Supreme Court reversed. Although it acknowledged that
“this court has held that a parent's unmarried cohabitation with a romantic
263

Id. at 117.
Id.
265
The court observed that: “She simply alleges that his living openly as a homosexual needed
to be appropriately explained to the children through the help of professional counseling and a
cooperative effort by both parents--not an unreasonable request.” Id. at 118. The father,
however, who became visibly angry in the Mother’s presence, maintained that she had difficulty
accepting his sexual orientation and had refused to work with him. Id.
266
110 S.W.3d 731 (Ark. 2003).
267
Id. at 732.
268
Id.
269
Id. at 732-33.
270
Id. at 734. The court cited the Taylor decision.
264
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partner, or a parent's promiscuous conduct or lifestyle, in the presence of a child
cannot be abided,”271 it emphasized “the absence of proof that a homosexual
relationship was occurring” and the evidence showing that the children were
well adjusted and happy and “had not been adversely affected” by their mother’s
living arrangement.272
The distinction between homosexuality per se and non-marital
cohabitation in the child’s presence remains good law in Arkansas. In a recent
case affirming a change of custody from mother to father, the intermediate court
of appeal claimed that its decision did not depend on the mother’s sexual
orientation, but the fact that she “had six different sexual partners in a four-anda-half year period. In every instance, appellant cohabited with her partner in the
presence of Zachary despite an explicit court order that forbade extramarital
cohabitation in front of the child.273
The Arkansas Supreme Court has applied the same test to heterosexual
couples, upholding a transfer of custody in 2005 based on the mother’s nonmarital cohabitation, remarking that it indicated instability in the child’s life.274
Arkansas courts continue to affirm the important of moral values to custody
decisions.
In contrast to the other states, Kentucky has almost no reported opinions
271

Id. at 737.
Id. at 739.
273
Holmes v. Holmes, 2007 Ark. App. LEXIS 251 (Apr. 11, 2007). The initial order
prohibiting cohabitation occurred in response to the father’s first motion to modify custody,
when the mother was living with a man to whom she was engaged. The trial court, explaining
the change of custody, emphasized the mother’s purposeful lack of compliance with the court
order, and the fact that the non-cohabitation order was designed to provide stability in the
child’s life. The trial court found that the mother’s frequent change of partners showed a “lack
of residential, employment, financial and moral stability manifest[ing] an overall lack of stability
in Zachary's life warranting a change of custody.”
274
See Alphin v. Alphin, 219 S.W.3d 160 (Ark. 2005). The trial court relied explicitly on the
Mother’s “illicit sexual relationship” in changing custody, and viewed her marriage to the
boyfriend “as a ruse” because the partners testified that they moved up the date to look better in
front of the court. Id. at 165. The Supreme Court, in affirming the trial court order, observed
that: “It is true that this court and the court of appeals have held that extramarital cohabitation in
the presence of children ‘has never been condoned in Arkansas, is contrary to the public policy
of promoting a stable environment for children, and may of itself constitute a material change of
circumstances warranting a change of custody.’” (Citations omitted). Id. The court then noted,
however, that other cases in which the courts transferred custody involved violation of a noncohabitation order. It nonetheless upheld the transfer of custody in this case on the basis of the
court’s specific findings that the mother’s frequent changes of residence (and romantic partners)
involved instability not in the best interests of the child. Id. at 166. Justice Betty C. Dickey
dissented, accusing the trial court of applying a “blatant double standard” as it criticized the
mother’s “illicit sexual relationship” before her remarriage, but not the father’s relationship with
his new wife, who was three months pregnant with his child at the time they married. Id. at 167.
167 (Dickey, J., dissenting). The dissent also noted that the mother’s residential instability was
caused in part by the father’s failure to contribute to their daughter’s care. Id. at 167-68.
272
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on point. The last reported decision occurred in 1980, when the Kentucky Court
of Appeals, citing expert testimony, held that:
Without question, in my opinion, there is social stigma attached to
homosexuality. Therefore Shannon will have additional burdens to bear
in terms of teasing, possible embarrassment and internal conflicts. Also,
there is excellent scientific research on the effects of parental modeling
on children. Speculating from such data, it is reasonable to suggest that
Shannon may have difficulties in achieving a fulfilling heterosexual
identity of her own in the future. There would seem to me to be no
rational reason for purposely submitting a child to these additional and
potentially debilitating influences.275
The Kentucky courts refused to apply a similar standard to a case of
heterosexual cohabitation in 1989, holding that mere misconduct without a
showing that the misconduct has affected or is likely to have an adverse effect
on the child is an insufficient basis for a modification of custody.276 The only
recent case to address same-sex cohabitation is one refusing to recognize a
lesbian partner as a de facto parent under Kentucky law.277 While Kentucky
custody decisions may not be hostile to sexual activity outside of marriage, they
do appear hostile to such activity when it occurs between gay and lesbian
partners.
The five states with the highest median ages of marriage, Massachusetts,
New York, Rhode Island, Connecticut, and New Jersey, are also among the most
liberal in the country when it comes to numerous issues, including a parent’s
sexual choices. Massachusetts, most obviously, has mandated recognition of
same-sex marriage as a matter of basic equality. The New Jersey courts have
required recognition of a status comparable to marriage, and Connecticut has
adopted domestic partnership legislation.278 Nonetheless, the issue is not
whether these states take different positions on non-marital or same-sex
cohabitation from those in red states, but when they did so.
Massachusetts has ruled from the early eighties that “a parent’s lifestyle, standing alone, is insufficient ground for severing the natural bond
between a parent and a child.”279 In a 1980, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court reversed a dependency case that turned on the trial judge's finding that
"[t]he environment in which [the mother] proposes to raise the children, namely,
a Lesbian household, creates an element of instability that would adversely
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608 S.W.2d 64, 66 (Ky. Ct. App 1980).
Sosh v. Sosh, 1989 Ky. App. LEXIS 72 (Ct. App.)(mother’s extramarital affair with
overnight guest.
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B. F. v. T.D., 194 S.W.3d 310 (Ky. 2006)
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See supra note __.
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Doe v. Doe, 452 N.E.2d 29 (Mass. 1983).
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affect the welfare of the children."280 The appellate courts extended the ruling
in 1983 to a divorce proceeding, holding that the mother’s relationship with a
lesbian cohabitant was not grounds to grant sole custody to the father.281 Nor
did the court suggest restrictions on overnight visitors would be appropriate.
The New York cases of Di Stefano v. Di Stefano282 and In re Jane B.,283
decided in the seventies, have been cited by other jurisdictions as precedent for
restricting the custodial rights of gay or lesbian parents.284 Both cases granted
custody to the fathers over lesbian mothers, finding that same-sex cohabitation
“creates an improper environment” for children.285
Despite the early New York cases, the appellate division in 1986 upheld
a transfer of custody from the mother to a gay father living with a male partner
in one of the first reported cases in the country to do so.286 Thus, the court
distanced itself from the New York decisions of the seventies, adopting a nexus
test that made sexual orientation irrelevant absent a showing that the children
are emotionally affected.287 It also cited with approval another New York case,
striking restrictions on the father’s male partner as pointless and punitive.288
Rhode Island, like Kentucky, has relatively few cases on point. In 1989,
the state Supreme Court upheld conditions that prohibited a custodial mother
from having overnight male visitors even without a showing of negative impact
on the child.289 By 2000, however, the Supreme Court had no trouble upholding
a trial court’s finding that a request for such an order was frivolous.290 Rhode
Island has also recognized lesbian partners as de facto parents under state law.291
In Connecticut in 1980, the state supreme court upheld a restriction on
280

Bezio v. Patenaude, 410 N.E. 2d 1207, 1211 (Mass. 1980).
Doe v. Doe, 452 N.E.2d 29 (Mass. 1983).
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401 N.Y.S.2d 636(4th Dep't 1978) . In Di Stefano, the appellate court upheld a grant of
custody of the couple’s three children to the father, and conditioned the wife’s visitation on the
absence of her lesbian partner, finding that the lower court's decision “reasonably may be read to
conclude that the wife's conduct in failing to keep her lesbian relationship with . . . [her partner]
separate from her role as a mother has had, and predictably will have, a detrimental effect upon
the children.” Id. at 638.
283
380 N.Y.S.2d 848 (Sup. Ct. 1976).
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See, e.g., Kallas v. Kallas, 614 P.2d 641, 645 (Utah 1980).
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380 N.Y.S.2d 848, 859 (Sup. Ct. 1976)
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M.A.B., v. R.B., 510 N.Y.S.2d 960 (Sup. Ct. 1986).
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Id. at 927.
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See Gottlieb v Gottlieb, 488 N.Y.S.2d 180 (1985). In this case, the court excised portions of
the judgment that conditioned the father's visitation privileges upon the total exclusion of his
lover or any other homosexuals during visitation. The court said: "[The] daughter must be fully
conversant with the fact that her father has a live-in male lover, and that excluding the lover as a
condition of visitation serves no real purpose other than as a punitive measure against the
father.” Id. at 182 (Kupferman, J.P., concurring).
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Parrillo v. Parrillo, 554 A.2d 1043 (R. I. 1989).
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the father’s visitation that excluded overnight visitation "where the defendant is
living with another woman without the benefit of wedlock." 292 By 2000,
however, Connecticut courts were rejecting a mother’s request to limit father’s
visitation in light of his non-marital visitation because there was no evidence it
adversely affected children or that children, who were Catholic, expressed
religious concerns about it.293 In addition, the Superior Court had no difficulty
changing a joint custody order to sole custody for a lesbian mother living with
her partner in light of the father’s mental health issues, commenting only that
both parents had “non-traditional households.”294 The state also recognizes the
standing of same-sex partners to seek visitation.295
Finally, New Jersey has had the most complete transformation. In the
early seventies, state courts restricted the visitation rights of a father who took
his three children to gay marches and rallies. The court required in one case that
during visitation, the father could not:
1) not cohabit or sleep with any individual other than a lawful spouse,
2) not take the children or allow them to be taken to "The Firehouse,"
and
3) not involve the children in any homosexual related activities or
publicity.
4) not be in the presence of his lover.296
The New Jersey Supreme Court, in its 2006 decision requiring the state to
extend recognition to same sex couples on the same terms as marriage, referred
explicitly to this case as an example of discrimination.297 Nonetheless, as early
as 1979, the state appellate courts reversed a trial court order that transferred
custody from the mother to the father as a result of the mother’s
homosexuality.298
The red states in this group certainly differ from the blue states. Of the
five red states with the lowest median age of marriage, only one (Oklahoma)
expressly reversed a trial court’s consideration of a parent’s same-sex
cohabitation because it did not make specific findings of adverse effect. Three
states (Utah, Idaho and Arkansas) have upheld the relevance of such
292

Gallo v. Gallo, 440 A.2d 782, 787 (Conn. 1981). It nonetheless limited the restriction to the
woman about whom the trial court had made specific findings with respect to the impact on the
child rather than to all women.
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Duffany v. Duffany, 2000 Conn. Super. LEXIS 2821.
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Zienka v. Zienka, 2004 Conn. Super. LEXIS 1638.
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Laspina-Williams v. Laspina-Williams, 742 A.2d 840, 844 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1999) (holding
that lesbian co-parent had standing to petition for visitation).
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In re J. S. & C., 324 A.2d 90, 97 (N.J. Sup. 1974).
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Lewis v Harris, 908 A.2d 196.
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considerations, with Arkansas and Idaho doing so in relatively recent decisions
and Utah doing so in 1994. In contrast, in the five blue states with the highest
median age of marriage, the most recent decision we could find addressing nonmarital sexuality in the context of custody or visitation was the 1989 Rhode
Island decision affirming restrictions over overnight heterosexual cohabitation.
Massachusetts and New Jersey were reversing trial court decisions based on
sexual orientation by 1980, and New York expressly affirmed the transfer of
custody from a fit mother to a gay father in the mid-eighties. None of the five
states have current reported decisions within the last decade restricting custody
or visitation on the basis of the parent’s sexual activity.
Aside from the results, the tone of the cases differs as well. The state
supreme courts in Utah, Idaho and Arkansas have expressly affirmed the lower
courts’ consideration of parent’s morality, while the blue state courts, especially
in Massachusetts and New Jersey, were more likely to use the language of
equality,299 and even when using similar language, more likely to overturn lower
court decisions that took sexual orientation into account.300
Nonetheless, the reported judicial decisions show significantly less
polarization than the legislation on abortion and same-sex marriage. All of the
reported decisions reject sexual orientation as a per se factor precluding custody
or visitation, and all require findings of fact that tie sexuality to an impact on the
children, though they differ in the rigor of the showing necessary to do so.301
Moreover, the states generally appear to be moving in the direction of less rather
than more regulation of sexuality even if they are not all doing so at the same
time.302 The most telling facts may be not so much the cases on the record, but
the relative silence from states such as Utah unlikely to rule out such
considerations altogether.
299

See especially New Jersey and Massachusetts decisions on marriage supra.
Trial courts in a number of states found that parents with unmarried partners created more
unstable environments for their children. Compare, e.g., Holmes v. Holmes, 2007 Ark. App.
LEXIS 251 (April 11, 2007)(upholding decision transferring custody to father after
consideration of wife’s “unstable” relationships with different partners) with Bezio v.
Patenaude, 381 Mass. 563, 579 (1980) (overturning trial court decision based on such grounds).
301
See, e.g., Holmes v. Holmes, 2007 Ark. App. LEXIS 251 (Apr. 11, 2007)(construing the trial
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cohabitation). Cf. In re Marriage of Wicklund, 932 P.2d 652 (Wash. 1996)(parental conduct
may be restricted only if child's physical, mental, or emotional health would be endangered).
302
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D. Conclusion: Family Law Federalism: Is Polarization Avoidable?
If two different family systems exist, then conflict may appear
inevitable. We believe, however, that the tensions between the two systems can
be managed. That is, the greatest clashes occur in the context of high profiles
cases (e.g., Roe v. Wade and its progeny) that become wedge issues serving the
interests of political parties that hope to profit at the ballot box. The alternative
is a system of dispute resolution that creates more space for the evolution of
family mores over time.
Nonetheless, the question of whether elected state courts can effectively
police the fairness of trial court results in the context of contested values
remains in doubt. A series of Alabama decisions demonstrate that the culture
wars we have chronicled exist within states as much as they do between red
states and blue, and the injection of polarized rather than consensus values into
the debate undermines the role of courts in mediating public morality even in the
most conservative of states.
Let us turn to Alabama. The Chief Justice of the Alabama Supreme
Court Roy Moore is renowned for his insistence on displaying the ten
commandments in the Alabama courthouse, and Alabama eventually removed
him from office because of his defiance of the federal order requiring that he
desist. 303 Less well known is his injection of religious authority into family law
decision-making. His efforts came to a head in Ex parte H.H.304 In that case,
the mother, who was living with a lesbian partner in California, sought to
modify an order granting the father custody, on the grounds that the father was
physically abusive toward the children, whipping them with a belt, and slapping
at least one of the children hard enough to cause a nosebleed.305 The father
disputed the characterization and severity of the events. The trial court ruled in
his favor, but the court of appeals reversed finding that the mother had
substantiated her claim of physical abuse.306 The Alabama Supreme Court
reversed again, reinstating the trial court judgment. It held in a brief opinion
that the appellate court should have deferred to the trial court judge, who had
evaluated “the credibility of the testimony and who observed the demeanor of
the witnesses, [and] found that, although the father's disciplinary actions may
occasionally be excessive, no abuse had occurred. 307
303

See Alabama Ousts Justice Moore, WorldNetDaily, November 13, 2003 (reporting that Chief
Justice Roy Moore had been removed from the court halfway through his elected term for
“defiance of a federal judge's order to move his Ten Commandments monument from the
rotunda of the state courthouse.”)
http://www.worldnetdaily.com/news/article.asp?ARTICLE_ID=35566.
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Justice Moore wrote a separate opinion to emphasize that “the
homosexual conduct of a parent—conduct involving a sexual relationship
between two persons of the same gender—creates a strong presumption of
unfitness that alone is sufficient justification for denying that parent custody of
his or her own children.”308 He acknowledged that the mother had entered into a
domestic partnership in California, but found this utterly irrelevant, given that
Alabama provides no legal recognition to same-sex relationships. Moreover, he
insisted, in extremely strong and direct language, that:
Homosexual conduct is, and has been, considered abhorrent, Immoral,
detestable, a crime against nature, and a violation of the laws of nature and of
nature's God upon which this Nation and our laws are predicated. Such conduct
violates both the criminal and civil laws of this State and is destructive to a basic
building block of society -- the family. The law of Alabama is not only clear in
its condemning such conduct, but the courts of this State have consistently held
that exposing a child to such behavior has a destructive and seriously
detrimental effect on the children. It is an inherent evil against which children
must be protected.309
The contrast between the majority opinion and the concurrence is
striking. In earlier cases, the Alabama Supreme Court had held that a trial court
could restrict custody and visitation to avoid children’s exposure to non-marital
cohabitation even without a showing of detriment to the child.310 In this case,
the court did not mention these prior rulings, which would have provided an
alternative basis for the result. Instead, the court used technical grounds for the
reversal, finding that the intermediate court had not given sufficient deference to
the trial court’s findings of fact.. Justice Moore, in one of the single most
intemperate opinions in the country, used the occasion not only to reaffirm the
earlier rulings, but to condemn homosexuality with references to “Sodom and
Gomorrah.”311
The Alabama Supreme Court, increasingly wary of the issue,
demonstrated similar deference to the trial court in a heterosexual cohabitation
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See Ex parte J.M.F., 730 So. 2d 1190 (Ala. 1998), holding that where the father had
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with her lesbian partner, the trial court could transfer custody to father on the basis of a best
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case decided the same year.312 The parties had divorced as a result of the
mother’s adultery, and the mother had moved in with her boyfriend while the
father was stationed with the Army in Korea.313 By the time of the appellate
decision, she had also given birth to a child with the boyfriend.314 The court of
appeals nonetheless affirmed the trial court’s refusal to grant the father’s motion
to modify custody, and the Supreme Court declined to grant certiorari.315
Justice Moore filed an impassioned dissent, writing that, “[f]or years there has
been a steady deterioration of this Court's standard regarding the fitness of an
adulterous parent in a custody case. Prior decisions of this Court establish a
conclusive presumption that a parent who has committed adultery is unfit to
have custody of a minor child.”316
Justice Moore, elected to his position on the Alabama Supreme Court,317
wished to make the reaffirmation of Christian standards of morality central to
family law decision-making. The other justices responded by shifting to more
technical and procedural grounds for their decisions – and have declined to take
another non-marital cohabitation (heterosexual or homosexual) case in the five
years since Justice Moore’s opinions.318 In the interim, the Alabama appellate
courts have neither actively policed the fairness of trial court decisions 319 nor
312
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We thank political scientist Jane Curry for the observation that whether or not justices are
elected might affect decision-making in this area. Oklahoma, which has gone the farthest
towards a blue state approach of our five red states on non-marital cohabitation, has an
appointed judiciary. Arkansas, which has taken the largest number of cases involving nonmarital cohabitation, has an elected judiciary, as do Alabama, Idaho, and Kentucky. See Institute
for Legal Reform, Justice System,
http://www.instituteforlegalreform.com/states/justicesystem.cfm?state=ID. Utah justices are
appointed. AMERICAN JUDICATURE SOCIETY, JUDICIAL SELECTION IN THE STATES: APPELLATE
AND GENERAL JURISDICTION COURTS (2004), http://www.ajs.org/js/JudicialSelectionCharts.pdf.
In the five blue states – Massachusetts, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey and Rhode Island -all of the justices of the states’ highest court are appointed. Id.
318
Lower Alabama courts have dealt with issues of nonmarital cohabitation during this time
period. In Pankey v. Pankey, 848 So. 2d 958, 961 (Ala. Civ. App. 2002), the court referred to
the mother’s adultery, the existence of the child she bore with the boyfriend, and the boyfriend’s
financial support, but, nonetheless, did not change custody to the father. Id. at 961-62. In the
one appellate decision to raise the issue of homosexual conduct during this time period, the
court went out of its way to emphasize that the trial court had not based its decision transferring
custody to the father solely on the mother’s cohabitation with a lesbian partner, but rather on an
unweighted variety of factors, including allegations of neglect and interference with the father’s
visitation, affecting the child’s best interests. L.A.M. v. B.M., 906 So. 2d 942 (Ala. Civ. App.
2004). The court underscored the father's testimony that he would have had the same concerns
for the child's well being if the mother’s partner “was a man” and that the “visitation disputes,
neglect, and a concern for the child's safety, as well as the mother's relationship with P.M., gave
him reason to file the modification petition.” Id. at 947
319
The courts have been more willing to do so in the cases of heterosexual cohabitation. In
another cases decided in 2002, the intermediate appellate court reversed a trial court decision
313
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claimed a role as arbiters of family morality with the same confidence as the
courts in earlier eras. 320
V.

CREATING SPACE FOR FAMILY LAW FEDERALISM

Partisanship is an increasingly salient fact of American political life.
Political activists have used “wedge” issues to energize their core supporters,
and divide an electorate that most polls show has overwhelmingly moderate and
stable political views.321 Few issues have been more successful in this respect
than moral values. While public attitudes on the economic, racial and other
issues that once defined party positions have remain largely unchanged over the
last forty years, public attitudes toward abortion and sexuality have shifted – and
become much more polarized. 322 We argue in this article that family issues are
not only particularly vulnerable to partisan tactics, but also that they are central
to the success of partisan tactics because the divisions over family values rest on
genuine and deep-seated cultural anxieties.
.
Age is the defining element in the tensions between the two systems.
The blue state system, which we have termed the “new middle class morality,”
posits a substantial separation from the beginning of adulthood and the
assumption of family responsibilities.323 This separation necessarily involves
that had transferred custody to the father solely on the basis of the mother’s cohabitation in the
presence of the child with men to whom she was not married. The appellate court reversed
holding that for “heterosexual misconduct” to be a basis for a change of custody, there must be a
showing of detriment to the child. Riley v. Riley, 882 So. 2d 342, 346 (Ala. Civ. App. 2002).
Although the opinion was issued in November, 2002, it was not released for publication until
mid-2004. See, e.g., Davis v. Davis, 883 So. 2d 1252 (Ala. Civ. App. 2003)(reversing trial
court modification of custody order on the basis of the mother’s non-marital cohabitation,
finding that it was insufficient as sole basis for modification of custody in case in which mother
married boyfriend, and father also had intimate partner overnight in the house in the presence of
the children).
320
For example, in 1998, the Alabama Supreme Court baldly stated: “[e]ven without this
evidence that the children have been adversely affected by their mother's relationship, the trial
court would have been justified in restricting R.W.'s visitation, in order to limit the children's
exposure to their mother's lesbian lifestyle . . . Restrictions such as those at issue here are
common tools used to shield a child from the harmful effects of a parent's illicit sexual
relationships -- heterosexual or homosexual.” Ex parte D.W.W., 717 So. 2d 793, 796 (Ala.
1998).
321
John W. Evans, Have Americans’ Attitudes Become More Polarized?—An Update, 84 SOC.
SCI. Q. 71 (2003); FIORINA, supra note __.
322
Delia Baldassarri and Andrew Gelman, Partisans without constraint: Political polarization
and trends in American public opinion, (June 13, 2007),
http://www.stat.columbia.edu/~gelman/research/unpublished/BGpolarization4.pdf (finding
polarization on moral issues largely non-existent forty years ago, greater polarization today on
moral issues among the better educated and more politically active, and polarization on moral
issues increasing much more dramatically since the mid-eighties).
323
As discussed supra, sociologist Barbara Dafoe Whitehead has termed this new “pathways to
adulthood.” She observes that “preparation for adult life is more prolonged than it has been in
the past. This is largely due to two related factors: a longer period of schooling before entry into
the work world and the postponement of marriage until older ages.” Barbara DaFoe Whitehead,

58

RED FAMILIES V. BLUE FAMILIES

59

training for autonomy.324 Young adults now have more time in which they must
manage dramatically more choices about sexuality,325 the nature of workforce
participation, and the construction of gender roles.326 When in their mid-to-late
twenties (or early thirties for the more educated) they form families, they do so
as mature adults, already socialized into adult roles. The linchpin in this process
is avoiding improvident childbirth, and that too is a matter of managing choice:
birth control, abortion, and the possibility of single parenthood are critical
options in the new era.327
New life patterns present a direct affront to more traditional,
conservative, and religious moral understandings and to the laws that have
supported them. They conflict with the systems that have historically
shepherded young adults from parent-supervised adolescence into formally
prescribed adult roles. Yet, marriage at younger ages is a risky enterprise. It
has historically required a high degree of community-reinforced socialization
into marital roles – including stereotypical gender roles, male financial
contributions and female dependence – to succeed. 328 New research emphasizes
that full emotional maturity does not occur until the mid-twenties, and the less
than fully mature early twenties brain (especially if male) is primed for risktaking and sexual experimentation.329 At the same time, the modern economy
provides fewer opportunities for the men who are ready to start families in their
early twenties to move into productive employment.330
Trends Shaping Youthful Sexuality,
http://www.nplc.org/commonground/papers/whiteheadpaper.htm
324
Id.
325
Whitehead emphasizes that one of the most dramatic elements in this shift is the interval
between age of first intercourse (17 for women, 16 for men) and marriage (25 for women and 26
for men). For African-Americans, the average interval is 12 years for women and 19 years for
men. Id.
326
MILTON C. REGAN, JR., ALONE TOGETHER: LAW AND THE MEANINGS OF MARRIAGE (1999),
AND FAMILY LAW AND THE PURSUIT OF INTIMACY (1993)(describing the challenge of intimacy in
a post-modern world where roles, rather than constitutive of self, become partial, changing and
subject to an almost infinite array of choices and combinations).
327
We note that while we have described the process of cultural change largely in geographic terms,
the rate at which different groups have moved toward the blue state model also differs by class and
race. The most highly educated sector of the population throughout the country is more likely to
defer the beginning of sexual activity, more likely to use contraception to manage non-marital
sexuality and less likely to experience non-marital childbirth. See McLanahan, supra. Moreover,
there is considerable disagreement on the benefits of postponing childbearing for the most
disadvantaged portions of the population. Studies show, for example, that African-Americans
experience greater fertility problems than whites, and depend more on older relatives such as
grandparents who may be less able to assist as time passes. See, e.g., AT Geronimus, The weathering
hypothesis and the health of African-American women and infants: evidence and speculations. 2 Ethn
Dis 207 (1992) (documenting faster decline in fertility for African-Americans.)
328
For a discussion of the relationship between marriage and socialization into gender roles, see
MILTON C. REGAN, JR., FAMILY LAW AND THE PURSUIT OF INTIMACY 92-94 (1993).
329
See supra note __.
330
Liana C. Sayer, Nathan Wright and Kathryn Edin, Class Differences in Family Attitudes 3
(2005)(summarizing literature on class, employment prospects, and family patterns)(manuscript on
file with authors)(review and resubmit, Journal of Marriage and the Family).
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These changes pose challenges for the country (and, indeed, the world)
as a whole. They exacerbate class and racial inequalities. In Europe and Japan,
they are associated with an increasingly intense debate about fertility rates that
have plunged well below the replacement level.331 In the United States,
however, they contribute to polarization over the issue of morality because they
lead to very different political and legal prescriptions. The “blue states” (and
the more liberal, more secular elite everywhere) have largely accepted the
changes. They support their daughters’ education about sexuality and birth
control. They want abortion to be available. They address sexuality activity
through a lens of tolerance and equality. They recognize that women’s financial
and men’s domestic contributions are vital to family success. They negotiate
rather than mandate family formation and the assumption of adult roles. And to
the extent they share concern about family instability and unbridled sexuality,
they believe that the solutions lie in private reinforcement of acceptable
standards of conduct rather than in public condemnations.
For the red states (and particularly for the more conservative, more
traditional and religious among them), these changes have produced a high
degree of cognitive dissonance. The cornerstone of the change – the increasing
delay between the beginning of adulthood and marriage – is impossible to
manage within the established values framework. Relaxing attitudes towards
non-marital sexuality requires letting go of religiously mandated teachings.
Yet, expecting abstinence until the mid-twenties is unrealistic. Social science
research does suggest that religious women start sexuality activity later, but
more than half of even weekly church-goers were no longer virgins by the age
of 18;332 it further suggests that well over 90% of all adults engage in sex before
they marry, and that even those who delay sexual activity into their twenties are
likely to do so.333 Moreover, marriage at an early age – particularly one
compelled by an improvident pregnancy – is unlikely to last, and the children
produced by dysfunctional unions a greater drain on public and grandparent
resources. To the extent that abstinence and early marriage have worked
historically, they have required a high degree of public consensus and
reinforcement of appropriate behavior. Nationally, that consensus is gone.334
The divergence in these family systems and worldviews poses a difficult
challenge for law. If each system proceeded on its own terms, within political
331

Indeed, a new European paper suggests that the difference between the higher fertility
northern European states and the lower fertility Southern European states is age of family
formation. Young adults in higher fertility nations begin childbearing (and leave home) at
earlier ages; they are also more likely to have children outside of marriage. See Bignami-Van
Assche and Billari, supra note __.
332
MARK D. REGNERUS, FORBIDDEN FRUIT: SEX & RELIGION IN THE LIVES OF AMERICAN
TEENAGERS 121 (2007).
333
Id.
334
See discussion supra note __.
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and legal units that shared a common cultural framework, we would predict
continued evolution, but not necessarily irreconcilable conflicts. Differences
about family morality are not unprecedented and have undergone similar
processes of evolution in the past. Moreover, the two systems share common
values and objectives. The secular middle class is rediscovering the importance
of commitment, with falling divorce rates and more self-conscious consideration
of the importance of stability for children.335 Falling teen birth rates involve
greater abstinence as well as more effective contraception, particularly for the
better off.336 The length of time between the beginning of sexuality and
marriage is increasing in red states as well as blue, and doing so without much
evidence of abstinence extending into early adulthood. And all states are to
some degree purple, with differences within them that play out on race, class,
gender, religious and urban/rural lines.
Nonetheless, the intrusion of polarized political discourse into core
issues of family law poses a particular difficult challenge for the judiciary. The
courts, in their day-to-day decision-making on intimate family matters often act
as midwives guiding the birth of new values. The change in custody decisionmaking from a maternal preference to an ideal of shared custody presents a case
in point. Faced with increasing divorce rates and the changing role of women,
the judiciary, with or without legislation in the background, articulated on a
case-by-case basis over a period of decades new willingness to consider shared
custody arrangements, and the development of principles that made shared
responsibility for children the new starting point for custody decision-making.
Despite the opposition of both feminists and traditionalists, the new ethic has
taken hold not just in terms of legal doctrine, but as a consensus norm for postdivorce ordering.337
Effective judicial leadership, however, requires a consensus-building,
non-partisan stance. Such leadership may not be possible on abortion,338 just as
the courts foundered historically on no-fault divorce. Significant portions of the
judiciary and the public had been willing to consider mutual consent divorce
without a showing of fault since the 1920’s. Religious opposition, however,
blocked no-fault legislation for decades. In the interim, courts circumvented the
legislative stalemate through expansion of the category of “extreme cruelty” or
manufactured cases of adultery.339 The hypocrisy involved in implementing
legislation that no longer reflected the views of the judges or the litigants before
them, however, threatened the legitimacy of the judicial process. The disrepute
that infected the process may have ultimately made as powerful a case for
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McLanahan, supra note __.
CHILD TRENDS, CHILD TRENDS DATA BANK, PERCENTAGE OF BIRTHS TO UNMARRIED
WOMEN, http://www.childtrendsdatabank.org/indicators/75UnmarriedBirths.cfm.
337
For an account of this transformation, see CARBONE, supra note __, Chapter 13
338
See Post and Siegel, supra note __.
339
Id.
336

61

RED FAMILIES V. BLUE FAMILIES
divorce reform as the substance of the no-fault principle itself.340
The divergence in family systems in a time of partisanship poses similar
challenges as the courts navigate the political and cultural minefields underlying
moral issues. Condemnation of non-marital sexuality might have moral salience
when made on a consensus basis; it has little as a partisan stance. Nonetheless,
excusing non-martial cohabitation, particularly between same-sex couples, may
be a matter of course in Rhode Island and politically perilous in Arkansas. The
experience of the Alabama appellate courts, which have skirted condemnation of
non-marital cohabitation once Justice Moore associated it with assertion of
Biblical references as legal authority, provides a cautionary case in point. So,
too, does the experience of the New Hampshire legislature in first embracing,
then rejecting parental notification laws with a change in the political
composition of the legislature. Parental notification, even if misguided, once
commanded overwhelming political support. Nuanced implementation might
have diffused the symbolic affront to traditional values while softening or
circumventing the difficulties of implementation.341 Using it to wage culture
war through the initiative process threatens to discredit the enterprise, and to
undermine the credibility of the judiciary who must implement the resulting
laws.342
At the same time, however, values assertion, when done as a genuine
expression of either consensus leadership or majority values, does have a place
in the judicial process. Recognition that there may be two (or more) internally
coherent and conflicting family systems raises challenges for a federal system
whether or not they are caught up in partisan challenges. Yet, these challenges
should be the ordinary ones of federalism, rather than polarized disputes that
threaten to derail judicial decision-making. Federalism, after all, is designed to
recognize and diffuse regional differences. We note, in particular, the following
tools at its disposal:
First, given the deep divisions we have documented, the expression of
values may be best undertaken within smaller political units with greater
sensitivity to regional variation. Family law, in particular, is state law, and
340

Id.
In Maine, for example, a doctor’s statement provides the basis for objection. ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 22, §§ 1597-A(2)(A)(West 2007). The doctor’s statement, as opposed to use of
the judicial process, keeps the issue private. Moreover, as Professor Sanger’s article
demonstrates, doctors are involved in counseling the patients on whom they would perform
abortions in any event; judges are unsuited to the role, and the formal judicial process serves
primarily to humiliate teens caught up in the process, who, if they have good reasons not to
inform their parents, are likely to be already victims of dysfunctional families and often coercive
or abusive sexual relations. Sanger, Regulating Teenage Abortion, supra note __.
342
The overwhelming experience of judges conducting judicial bypass proceedings is to refuse
to hear the cases, to reject all petitions on the basis of anti-abortion beliefs, or to rubber stamp
them on the grounds that the courts have little basis on which to second guess the assertions.
See id.
341
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articulation of normative aspirations can be undertaken at that level. While
incorporating fire and brimstone in judicial decisions may not be appropriate
anywhere, sensitivity to religious values and appropriate cultural expression of
these values will necessarily differ with geography and time.343
Second, the courts should continue to police the distinction between the
expression of shared values, and the imposition of state control on those who
dissent. Lawrence v. Texas,344 which held criminal prosecution of same-sex
sodomy unconstitutional, struck exactly the right balance in this regard. It
provided safeguards from state intrusion in the bedroom, recognizing the value
of same-sex intimacy without a direct challenge to the expression of contrary
values. The majority opinion emphasized that:
These matters, involving the most intimate and personal choices a person
may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and autonomy, are
central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. At the heart of
liberty is the right to define one's own concept of existence, of meaning, of the
universe, and of the mystery of human life. Beliefs about these matters could not
define the attributes of personhood were they formed under compulsion of the
State."345
Third, the courts should pay particular attention to the avenues of family
evolution. The Supreme Court decisions in Griswold v. Connecticut and Roe v.
Wade were important milestones in protecting autonomy in individual decisions
about the constitution of family. While we believe there is room for legislating
balancing in the terms of access to such services, the courts should continue to
guard against wholesale prohibitions.346 Access to contraception could easily
become as much of a battleground as access to abortion.347
Fourth, courts often diffuse hot button issues by selecting less
controversial frames as a basis for resolution. A critical part of respect for
differing family systems, for example, involves interstate travel and recognition,
and the right to travel is likely to become an increasingly important part of

343

The polygamy cases, particularly those involving polygamous marriages performed abroad,
also involve interesting issues along these lines. American courts have tended to deal with the
issue by refusing to recognition the validity of the marriage itself, but often implementing
inheritance rights that depend on the marriage. In objecting to polygamy, moreover, modern
courts use secular rather than Christian justifications for asserting incompatibility with
American law. SEE LESLIE JOAN HARRIS, LEE C. TEITELBAUM AND JUNE CARBONE, FAMILY
LAW 187-90 (2005).
344
See supra note __.
345
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 574 (citing Casey).
346
In this respect, we are persuaded by the extensive literature that locates the widespread
opposition to Roe less in religious principles about the beginning of life, but in opposition to the
creation of new understandings about family formation. See Post and Siegel, supra note ___,
Kristen Luker. The Politics of Motherhood, supra, __.
347
Russell Shorts, Contra- Contraception, N.Y. TIMES, May 7, 2006, 6 (magazine), at 48

63

RED FAMILIES V. BLUE FAMILIES
abortion jurisprudence.348 The fight for interstate recognition of same-sex
adoption and parenting is already winning more battles than the fight for samesex marriage,349 in part because it is a less direct and confrontational fight, and
in part because it draws on the strengths of our federalist system. In similar
fashion, where values conflicts threaten to undermine judicial legitimacy,
decisions that use procedural devices to avoid judgment on controversial issues
may command greater support. The Alabama decisions that emphasized
deference to trial court findings of fact provided a way to diffuse irreconcilable
conflict on the source of custody decision-making. 350
Finally, in the face of irreconcilable differences, silence may sometimes
be the better course. Legislatures, for example, have largely chosen not to
regulate assisted reproduction, and, indeed, a third of state legislatures have yet
to address the less controversial issue of paternity in the context of artificial
insemination by donor.351 The Supreme Court, which only rarely hears family
law cases in any event, has not granted certiorari on the host of parental rights
cases that have arisen since its 2000 decision in Troxel v. Granville.352
Nonetheless, the courts should seize opportunities to crystallize a moral
shift capable of commanding broad acceptance. The courts in Oklahoma,
Mississippi, Illinois, Georgia and Rhode Island have each used the common law
process to recognize the change from per se condemnation of non-marital
cohabitation to closer exploration of the nexus between sexual activity and
parenting. These decisions may have taken place at different times in different
contexts in different states, but in each case the decisions reflected a change in
approach that synthesized a gradual evolution in sensibilities.
The role of the courts in mediating values conflicts can be instrumental
in expressing the common ground underlying seeming conflicts. Case-by-case
decision-making that can be tailored to the facts at hand is often less divisive
than broader pronouncements of legislation or morality. Family law has become
a situs for fundamental moral change, and the integrity of the courts an
important instrument in values formation. The courts have historically played
the midwife role to cultural change in other contexts, and they have begun to
play that role in working through the minefield of non-marital sexuality. They
cannot do so, however, when caught in a culture war that sees judicial outcomes
as exercises of power in which one ideological side "wins" over the other.
348

See SUSAN FRELICH APPLETON, GENDER, ABORTION, AND TRAVEL AFTER
ROE'S END, 51 St. Louis L.J. 655 (2007); Teresa Collett Stanton, supra.
349
See Miller-Jenkins v. Miller-Jenkins, 637 S.E.2d 330 (Va. App. 2006) (reversing lower court
refusal to recognize parenting status based on Vermont civil union on jurisdictional grounds);
Finstuen v. Crutcher, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 18500 (10th Cir. August 3, 2007)(holding that
Oklahoma must give full faith and credit to adoptions by same-sex parents in other states).
350
See supra notes __.
351
NAOMI CAHN, THE PARENT PLAN (forthcoming 2008).
352
Troxel v. Granville, 528 U.S. 1151 (2000).
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When that happens, the moral authority of the courts becomes a casualty.
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Appendix A
The states ranked in accordance with votes for Bush

RED STATES
UT
WY
ID
NE
OK
AL
ND
AK
KS
TX
SD
MS
KY
IN
MT
GA
SC
LA
TN
NC
WVA
AR
VA
ARK
MO
CO
FL
OH
NM
NEV
IA

71
69
68
67
66
63
63
62
62
61
60
60
60
60
59
58
58
57
57
56
56
55
54
54
53
52
52
51
50
50
50

BLUE STATES
MA
VT
RI
NY
MD
CT
CA
ME
IL
HI
NJ
DE
WA
OR
MI
MN
NH
PA
WI

37
39
39
40
43
44
44
45
45
45
46
46
46
47
48
48
49
49
49
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APPENDIX B

State353

Required Parental Involvement in
Minors’ Abortions354
Consent
Notification
None

Alabama r
Alaskar

X
▼

Arizona r
Arkansas r

X
X

California
Colorado r
Connecticut
Delaware
DC
Florida r
Georgia r

▼

Hawaii
Idaho r
Illinois
Indiana r
Iowa
Kansas r

X

Gay
marriage355

Teen
Pregnancy
Rate Rank356

S 98
Broad S 97,
C 98
S 96
Broad s ‘97,
C ‘98
S 00
S 00
X

X*360

S 96
X

X
X
X
§
▼
X
X
X

353

Broad S 97
Broad C 04,
S 96,
S 98
S 96
S 96
S 97
S 98
S 96

Divorce
Rate
2004358

15
30

Teen
Abortion
Rate
Rank357
30
35

Church
Attendance 2458% 359

4.9
4.3

58%
Not avail.

2
10

19
41

4.2
6.1

35%
55%

7
22
33
11
na
6
8

5
21
9
8
na
7
22

-4.4
3.1
3.7
1.9
4.8
--

32%
35%
37%
43%
33%

12
37
20
31
43
34

6
45
10
38
42
39

-5.0
2.6

52%

-2.8
3.3

Red indicates that George W. Bush won the state in the 2004 presidential election; Blue
indicates that John Kerry won the state in the 2004 presidential election.
354
Except where indicated, parental involvement laws in minors’ abortions require the
involvement of one parent and apply to minors under 18.
355
Based on National Gay and Lesbian Task Force (2005),
http://www.thetaskforce.org/downloads/marriagemap.pdf.
S refers to a statute; C refers to a constitutional amendment; broad refers to ban on other
forms of patnerhip recognition, other than the “basic” ban on same-sex marriage.
356
Ranking by rates of pregnancy per 1,000 women aged 15-19 according to state of
residence, 2000.
357
Ranking by rates of abortion per 1,000 women aged 15-19 according to state of
residence, 2000.
358
Divorce rates are based on provisional counts of divorces by state of occurrence. Rates
are per 1,000 total population residing in area. Includes annulments. Includes divorce
petitions filed or legal separations for some counties or States.
359
Church or Synagogue Attendance by State, San Diego Union-Tribune, May 2, 2006. The
national average is 42% or people who say they attend a church or synagogue either once a
week or almost once per week. There are no blue states in the top 15, and only one red state
in the bottom 15.
360
Law applies to women under 16

43%
42%
46%
46%
47%
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Kentucky r

X

Louisiana r

X

Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi r
Missouri r
Montana r

X

Broad C 04,
S 98
Broad C 04,
S 99
S 97

X*
X
X

Broad C 04,
S 96
S 97
S 97, C 04

Both parents
Both
parents
X

25

47

4.9

48%

19

44

--

58%

46
13
40
27

31
3
11
15

4.3
3.2
2.2
3.4

31%
41%
31%

47
3

36
28

2.8
4.5

44%
57%

29
38

34
32

3.8
3.8

46%
34%

41

40

3.4

53%

Nebraska r

X

S 96, C 04
Broad S 97,
C 04
Broad 00

Nevada r
New
Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico r
New York
North
Carolina r
North Dakota
r
Ohio r

▼
▼

C 02
S 04

1
48

4
25

6.4
3.9

27%
24%

X

S 96

16
4
14
9

1
18
2
17

3.0
4.6
3.0
4.2

34%
41%
33%
53%

Both
parents
X

Broad C 04,
S 97
Broad C &
S 04
Broad C 04,
S 96
C 04
S 96

50

48

3.1

43%

28

27

3.6

43%

21

37

4.9

50%

S 96

23
39
36
17

13
23
16
24

4.1
3.0
3.0
3.2

32%
43%
Not avail.
58%

X

S 96

44

49

3.1

45%

18
5

29
26

4.9
3.6

52%
49%

X

S 96
Broad S 03
& C 05
Broad C 04

45
49
32

50
33
20

4.1
3.9
3.9

55%
24%
44%

26
35

12
46

4.3
5.0

32%
46%

42

43

3.0

43%

▼

▼
▼
X

Oklahoma r
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South
Carolina r
South Dakota
r
Tennessee r
Texas r
Utah r
Vermont
Virginia r
Washington
West Virginia
r
Wisconsin

X
X
X
X
X361

X
X

X
X
X
X*

Broad S 04,
S 97
S 98
S 00

X*
361

Law applies to women under 17
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Wyoming r
Total

X
25

24
18

14

5.2

7+
DC

▼ Enforcement permanently enjoined by court order; policy not in effect.
§ Temporarily blocked by court order; policy not in effect.
* Allows specified health professionals to waive parental involvement if judge is unavailable.
˜ Physicians may, but is not required to, inform the minor’s parent

36%

